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Industrial Property Rights and the Free Movement
of Goods in the European Communities
by David R. Bumbak*
I. INTRODUCTION
A fundamental purpose of the European Economic Communities,
also known as the European Community or Common Market, is to
remove the traditional barriers to trade among its constituent Member
States. Existing national laws of these Member States are frequently at
odds with the concept of the free movement of goods across national fron-
tiers. National laws regarding the protection of intellectual property, e.g.,
patent, trademark and copyright laws, for example, have the effect of iso-
lating national markets from the enlarged single market created by the
European Community. This effect of national intellectual property laws
conflicts with the regional legal system established by the European Com-
munity which is designed to promote the economic integration of the
Member States.
The Court of Justice of the European Communities, a prime function
of which is to interpret provisions of the treaties establishing the Com-
mon Market for the guidance of national courts, has attempted to amelio-
rate this conflict through its interpretation of article 36 of the Treaty of
Rome. Article 36 of the Treaty of Rome, also known as the European
Economic Community Treaty (the EEC Treaty), recognizes that the pro-
tection of intellectual property rights, referred to in article 36 as indus-
trial or commercial property, merits an exception to the fundamental
Community policy of the free movement of goods. Several recent deci-
sions of the Court of Justice of the European Communities, or simply the
European Court, have addressed the scope of this exception, particularly
with regard to copyrights.
This article addresses the extent to which exceptions to the funda-
mental principle of the free movement of goods may justify the protection
of private, nationally created industrial property rights.' Community
* Associate, Arter & Hadden; J.D., Syracuse University (1983); B.A., Allegheny College
(1978).
The term "industrial property" is used here in its generic sense.
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competition rules2 and the free movement of services' will be examined to
the extent that these provisions also affect industrial property rights.
The European Court recently noted the potential conflict between
the variety of national laws protecting industrial property and the funda-
mental Community goal of the free movement of goods as follows:
The national rules relating to the protection of industrial property have
not yet been unified within the Community. In the absence of such unifi-
cation, the national character of the protection of industrial property and
the variations between the °different legislative systems on this subject
are capable of creating obstacles both to the free movement of [goods
and, in this case] of the patented products and to competition within the
Common Market."
The balancing of these conflicting policies has been the primary focus of
the Court's decisions involving article 36, and its interpretation of indus-
trial property rights.
The article begins with a brief overview of the EEC Treaty and the
Community legal system. The case law discussion focuses on three spe-
cific areas of national intellectual property law: trademarks, patents and
copyrights. It concludes with a statement of the European Court's pro-
gress in resolving these conflicts and an indication of which issues await
resolution through further case law or Community legislation.
II. THE COMMON MARKET, THE FREE MOVEMENT OF GOODS AND
INDUSTRIAL PROPERTY
A. Fundamental Goals of the European Community
The European Community is a regional attempt to integrate selected
areas of the economies of ten states in Western Europe-Belgium, Den-
mark, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Nether-
lands and the United Kingdom.5 Spain and Portugal are currently negoti-
ating terms of entry. One of the principal objectives of the European
Community is the establishment of a Common Market to promote the
2 Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community, Mar. 25, 1957, arts. 85-86,
298 U.N.T.S. 11, 47-49 [hereinafter cited as EEC Treaty].
3 Id. at 40-42 (arts. 59-66).
4 Parke, Davis, & Co. v. Probel, Reese, Beintema-Interpharm & Centrafarm, 1968 E.
Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 55, 71, 1968 Comm. Mkt. L.R. 47, 58.
' For an introduction to the history, laws and institutions of the European Community,
see L. COLLINS, EUROPEAN COMMUNITY LAW IN THE UNITED KINGDOM (1975); T. HARTLEY,
THE FOUNDATIONS OF EUROPEAN COMMUNITY LAw (1981); D. LASOK & J. BRIDGE, AN INTRO-
DUCTION TO THE LAW AND INSTITUTIONS OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES (2d ed. 1976). For an
introduction to the role of the European Court and its interpretive methodology, see A.
BREDIMAS, METHODS OF INTERPRETATION OF COMMUNITY LAW (1978).
Vol. 16:381
INDUSTRIAL PROPERTY RIGHTS
economic activities and approximate the economic policies of the Member
States.' The establishment of this Common Market "presupposes a high
degree of economic and political cooperation" among its members.7 This
factor distinguishes a Common Market from other less committed notions
of international economic cooperation such as the customs union," or the
free trade area.9
[W]hereas both free trade area and customs union are in their nature
concerned with eliminating tariff and nontariff barriers to trade between
their members, a common market has two additional features. First, it
seeks to remove obstacles to the free movement of factors of production;
at any rate labour and capital. Secondly, the common market adopts an
extended notion of the nontariff barrier to trade. Where diverse national
legislation and policy making tends to burden inter-state trade, the com-
mon market contemplates common standards and common policies.1
Elements of economic cooperation necessary to establish a common
market are set out in article 3 of the EEC Treaty. Foremost among these
is the elimination of custom duties and quantitative restrictions on the
import and export of goods between Member States, and all measures
having equivalent effect. 11 These elements also include: (1) the abolition
of restrictions on the free movement of services, capital and persons;1 2 (2)
the institution of a system to ensure undistorted competition within the
Community;13 and, (3) the approximation of the laws of the Member
States, insofar as are needed to ensure the proper functioning of the
6 EEC Treaty, supra note 2, 298 U.N.T.S. at 15 (art. 2). The EEC Treaty, unlike other
self-executing treaties in international law, has been described as:
[M]ore than an agreement which merely creates mutual obligations between the
contracting states .... [T]he states have acknowledged that Community law has
an authority which can be invoked by their nationals before [their national] courts
and tribunals .... [T]he Community [therefore] constitutes a new legal order of
international law for the benefit of which the states have limited their sovereign
rights, albeit within limited fields, and the subjects of which comprise not only
Member States but also their nationals.
N.V. Algemene Transport-en Expedite Onderneming van Gend & Loos v. Nederlandse ad-
ministrate der belastingen, 1963 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 1, 12, 1963 Comm. Mkt. L.R. 105,
129. See generally B. RUDDEN & D. WYATT, BASIC COMMUNITY LAWS (1980) (discussion of
EEC Treaty as amended). For a more thorough treatment of treaties applicable to the Euro-
pean Community, see 1-6 H. Smrr & P. HERZOG, THE LAW OF THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC
COMMUNITY (1976) (with supplemental updates).
7 D. WYATT & A. DAsHWOOD, THE SUBSTANTATIVE LAW OF THE EEC 20 (1980).
8 For example, the Benelux countries-Belgium, the Netherlands and Luxembourg.
9 For example, the European Free Trade Area.
20 D. WYATT & A. DASHWOOD, supra note 7, at 20-21.
" EEC Treaty, supra note 2, 298 U.N.T.S. at 16 (art. 3(a)).
" Id. (art. 3(c)).
13 Id. (art. 3(f)).
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Common Market.14
B. The Free Movement of Goods
The elimination of quantitative restrictions on the import and export
of goods and all measures having an equivalent effect is designed to pro-
mote the free movement of goods, a fundamental community policy. The
EEC Treaty contains three basic sets of provisions designed to implement
the establishment of this fundamental principle. 9
Article 9 of the EEC Treaty states that the Community "shall be
based upon a customs union which shall cover all trade in goods and
which shall involve the prohibition between Member States of customs
duties on imports and exports and of all charges having equivalent
effect."""
Articles 30-36 require the elimination of quantitative restrictions on
trade between Member States and measures having an equivalent effect,17
such as an import quota. These articles provide for the detailed imple-
mentation of the general principle established in article 3.1s The concept
of "measures having an equivalent effect," under article 30, has been
broadly construed to encompass virtually "all trading rules enacted by
Member States which are capable of hindering, directly or indirectly, ac-
tually or potentially, intra-Community trade."'
24 Id. (art. 3(h)).
1 Usher, The Consequences of the Notion of a Single Market: Recent Decisions of the
Court on the Free Movement of Goods, [1977] 2 LEGAL IssuEs EUR. INTEGRATION 39. See 1-6
H. SMrr & P. HERZOG, supra note 6 for commentary.
16 EEC Treaty, supra note 2, 298 U.N.T.S. at 18-19 (art. 9(1)). Part Two of the treaty
which contains article 9 is entitled "Free Movement of Goods." Articles 9-11 are introduc-
tory and establish basic rules. For an introduction to the EEC Treaty, see 1-6 H. Smrr & P.
HERZOG, supra note 6. Professors Smit and Herzog have noted that chapter 1 of the treaty
"deals ... with two symmetrical problems: the abolition of customs duties between Member
States (Section 1) and the establishment of a common customs tariff against third countries
(Section 2). Both of these aims had to be, and were, accomplished within the transitional
period [i.e., prior to Jan. 1, 1970]." 1 H. SMrr & P. HERZOG, supra note 6, at 2-37. In fact,
most of such restrictions were eliminated "with very minor exceptions by July 1, 1968." Id.
at 2-39.
17 EEC Treaty, supra note 2, 298 U.N.T.S. at 26-30 (arts. 30-37). Articles 30-37 deal
with the "elimination of quantitative restrictions between Member States." A familiar U.S.
example of a quantitative restriction is the "voluntary agreement" (having the effect of an
import quota) between the United States and Japan to limit the number of Japanese
automobiles entering the United states.
:8 Id. at 15-16 (art. 3).
1 Procureur du Roi v. Benoit & Gustave Dassonville, 1974 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 837,
852, [1974] 2 Comm. Mkt. L.R. 436, 453-54. See 1 H. Smrr & P. HERZOG, supra note 6, at 2-
127 to 2-129 and 2-131 to 2-132; Page, The Concept of Measures Having an Effect
Equivalent to Quantitative Restrictions, 2 EUR. L. REv. 105 (1977) (theoretical analysis of
the concept based on textual analysis of the Treaty and, primarily, the Dassonville case);
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Articles 95-99 are the Community tax provisions. These require that
the internal taxation policies of Member States be applied in a manner
that does not discriminate against products imported from other Member
States.2"
The concept of measures which have an effect equivalent to quantita-
tive restrictions, covered by articles 30-36, unlike charges having an effect
equivalent to customs duties (art. 9) or measures of internal taxation
(arts. 95-99), include "restrictions of a variety which may be invoked by
private individuals or undertakings."2 1 The result is that these treaty arti-
cles may affect "the exercise of what are traditionally thought of as pri-
vate property rights. '22 One such group of rights affected by articles 30-36
are industrial property rights.
C. Industrial Property Rights and Article 36
The term industrial property is used to describe specific valuable
rights associated with the production and distribution of goods. 23 The
principal industrial property rights are patents, trademarks and copy-
right.2 4 Other rights include "industrial designs, trade names and in some
Van Gerven, The Recent Case Law of the Court of Justice Concerning Articles 30 and 36 of
the EEC Treaty, 14 COMMON MKT. L. REv. 5 (1977).
20 ECC Treaty, supra note 2, 298 U.N.T.S. at 53 (art. 95). The Community tax provi-
sions are found generally in articles 95-99. See Usher, supra note 15, at 40, for commentary
on the relationship between internal taxation policies and charges having an effect
equivalent to customs duties. Subject to exceptions, the general rule is that financial charges
equally applied by a Member State to domestic and imported products, i.e., using the same
criteria, are not charges equivalent to customs duties. Such a financial charge will, however,
be deemed equivalent to a customs duty if the charge is intended exclusively to support
activities that specifically benefit a taxed domestic product. Id.
21 Usher, supra note 15, at 42.
22 Id.
23 D. WYATT & A. DASHWOOD, supra note 7, at 341. As the authors note, a listing of such
rights may be found in article 1(2) of the Paris Convention of March 20, 1883, recently
revised at Stockholm, July 14, 1977. Id. See World Intellectual Property Organization Publi-
cation No. 415(F) (Geneva 1973) (defining the similar term "intellectual property"), cited in
Harris, The Application of Article 36 to Intellectual Property, 1 EuR. L. REv. 515 (1976).
The term often used in the United States is "intellectual" property. The drafters of article
36 used the terms "industrial" and "commercial" property. As will be noted below, the
terms have been used interchangeably by the European Court to encompass virtually every
form of intellectual or industrial property-from patents to theatrical performance rights.
Hence, the terms shall be used interchangeably to denote the broad scope employed by the
European Court.
24 Jehoram, The Delicate Balance Between Industrial Property and European Law:
The Law as it Stands, [1976] 2 LEGAL IssuEs Etu. INTEGRATION 71, 72. See infra notes 29-32
and accompanying text for a discussion of the extent to which specific rights are included
within the phrase "industrial and commercial property" as used in article 36 of the EEC
Treaty.
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countries the existing service marks, utility models, indications of source,
appellations of origin and the so-called neighbouring rights (that is
neighbouring to copyright): exclusive rights in sound recordings, films and
broadcasts... and performance rights.
2 5
Industrial property rights reserve some economic advantage to their
owners. They are generally territorial in nature since they are exclusive
within, but limited to, the territory of the legal system which creates
them. Within this territory, the "protections afforded to these rights is
proprietary in nature, [i.e., it is] good against the world in general. '26 As a
consequence, the owner of the industrial property right may prohibit the
unauthorized exploitation of that right by third parties within the Mem-
ber State. This permits the proprietor "to erect watertight boundaries be-
tween national markets for his products, the purpose of which... is the
setting and maintaining of different prices on the different markets for
his products. 2 7 Hence, there is a "basic contradiction between .. . a
Common Market that eliminates all economic barriers between the Mem-
ber States and . .. the territorial monopolies resulting from the indus-
trial property rights in the Member States.
28
The European Court's case law has traditionally covered trademarks
and patents.2 9 In Musik-Vertrieb Membran GmbH and K-Tel Int'l v.
GEMA,30 the Court held for the first time that copyright and related
rights are also within the scope of article 36.1 GEMA involved copyright
in sound recordings and royalties due to the holder when the goods are
traded between Member States which have different royalty payment
schedules. Copyrights as related to performance rights were held to be
within the scope of article 36 in Coditel v. Cine Vog Films3 2 (Coditel I).
Coditel concerned broadcast rights in films and the relationship between
articles 36 and 59-66 (concerning the freedom to provide services). Recent
case laws$ has expanded the application of article 36 to encompass, by
analogy, the Community rules on the freedom to provide services.3' The
Court's challenge has been to reconcile the principles of article 36 with
25 Jehoram, supra note 24, at 72.
26 D. WYATr & A. DASHWOOD, supra note 7, at 341.
27 Jehoram, supra note 24, at 74.
28 Id. at 71.
29 See infra sections III and IV in text.
30 1981 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 147, [1981] 2 Comm. Mkt. L.R. 44. For a discussion of this
case, see infra notes 235-53 and accompanying text.
.1 1981 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. at 161, [1981] 2 Comm. Mkt. L.R. at 64.
32 1980 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 881, [1981] 2 Comm. Mkt. L.R. 362. For a discussion of
this case, see infra notes 213-34 and accompanying text.
33 See, e.g., S.A. Compagnie General pour la Diffusion de la Television, Coditel v. S.A.
Cine Vog Films, 1980 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 881, [1981] 2 Comm. Mkt. L.R. 362. For a
discussion of this case, see infra notes 213-34 and accompanying text.
34 EEC Treaty, supra note 2, 298 U.N.T.S. at 40-42 (arts. 59-66).
Vol. 16:381
INDUSTRIAL PROPERTY RIGHTS
various Community provisions, "insofar as they may provide grounds for
opposing the application of national rules protecting industrial property,
with Article 222 which preserves intact the system of property ownership
in the Member States.
3 5
1. Textual Analysis of Article 36
Article 36 was designed to ameliorate the potential conflict between
industrial property rights and Community law. It provides, in pertinent
part, as follows:
The provisions of Articles 30 to 34 inclusive shall not be an obstacle to
prohibitions or restrictions in respect of importation, exportation or
transit which are justified on grounds of... the protection of industrial
and commercial property. Such prohibitions or restrictions shall not,
however, constitute either a means of arbitrary discrimination or a dis-
guised restriction on trade between Member States.3
The central theme of the Court's case law on industrial property has been
the scope of the exceptions set forth in article 36, including the Commu-
nity rules on the free movement of goods, and the freedom to provide
services.
The first sentence of article 36 permits exceptions to the free move-
ment of goods when justified by the need to protect industrial property
rights.3 8 Nevertheless, one scholar concluded that "[i]t is, in fact, by no
means self-evident that the mere need to protect intellectual property
necessarily justifies that exemption in any particular case." 39 The decision
to grant an exemption is a matter for the European Court.40 Since the
general EEC Treaty principles are fundamental goals of the Community,
the exemptions have consistently been interpreted narrowly.
41
35 D. WYATT & A. DAsHwoOD, supra note 7, at 343. Article 222 states, "This Treaty
shall in no way prejudice the system existing in Member States in respect of property."
EEC Treaty, supra note 2, 298 U.N.T.S. at 88.
36 EEC Treaty, supra note 2, 298 U.N.T.S. at 29.
37 D. WYAr & A. DAsHWOOD, supra note 7, at 344. See also Blok, Articles 30-36 of the
EEC Treaty and Intellectual Property Rights: A Danish View, 13 INT'L REV. INDUS. PROP.
& COPYRIGHT L. (11C) 729 (1982).
11 Harris, supra note 23, at 517.
39 Id.
40 Id.
4' See, e.g., Merck & Co. Inv. v. Stephar B.V. & Petrus Stephanus Exler, 1981 E.
Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 2063, [1981] 3 Comm. Mkt. L.R. 463. For a discussion of this case, see
infra notes 180-96 and accompanying text. See also Reischl, Industrial Property and Copy-
right Before the European Court of Justice, 13 IN'L REv. INDUS. PROP. & COPYRIGHT L.
(HC) 415 (1982). For additional examples of narrowly construed exceptions to article 36, see
SpA Salgoil v. Italian Ministry for Foreign Trade, 1968 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 453, 1969
Comm. Mkt. L.R. 181; Re Advertising of Alcoholic Beverages: Commission of the European
1984
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The second sentence of article 36, however, "provides in effect that
there may be a further set of circumstances which reduces or nullifies the
first set of circumstances. '42 The second sentence has two additional hur-
dles. The sentence refers to restrictions on intra-Community trade that
may constitute a means of arbitrary discrimination or a disguised restric-
tion on trade between Member States.43 This is an express limitation on
the use of industrial property rights when that use restricts Community
trade. Even if exceptions to articles 30-34, which establish the basic rules
regarding the free movement of goods, are justified by the need to protect
industrial property, that will not suffice to qualify for the exemption
under article 36(1) if the use of the industrial property right causes a
disguised restriction on intra-Community trade." The European Court
has been very willing in industrial property cases to infer such a
restriction.45
2. Interpretive Concepts Derived from the European Court's Case
Law
The European Court has introduced two basic concepts in its inter-
pretation of article 36. The first concept is the European Court's distinc-
tion between the existence and exercise of industrial property rights. This
distinction was introduced impliedly in the early case of Consten and
Grundig v. Commission,4 and was expressly applied in Parke, Davis v.
Probel and others.47 The distinction is that the existence of industrial
property rights are determined solely by national law, whereas the exer-
cise of those rights may be limited by the Community insofar as they
affect trade between Member States.
The European Court articulated this distinction in the early case of
Sirena v. Eda.48 Sirena applied article 36 by analogy in examining the
limits which articles 85 and 86-the Community competition rules-place
on a proprietor's exercise of his national trademark rights.49 The Euro-
pean Court noted, as in Parke, Davis, that the absence of uniformity of
national laws on industrial property impeded the free movement of goods
Communities v. French Republic, 1980 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 2299, [1981] 2 Comm. Mkt.
L.R. 743.
42 Harris, supra note 23, at 517.
43 These concepts are discussed infra in the sections dealing with specific industrial
property rights. In short, the Court has not drawn a sharp distinction between the two.
44 Harris, supra note 23, at 518.
45 Id.
46 1966 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 299, 1966 Comm. Mkt. L.R. 418; see D. WYATr & A.
DASHWOOD, supra note 7, at 345.
47 1968 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 55, 1968 Comm. Mkt. L.R. 47.
48 1971 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 69, 1971 Comm. Mkt. L.R. 260.
'0 Id. at 81, 1971 Comm. Mkt. L.R. at 273.
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and the Community's system of competition. The Court held, therefore,
that:
Article 36, although it appears in the Chapter of the Treaty dealing with
quantitative restrictions on trade between Member States, is based on a
principle equally applicable to the question of competition, in the sense
that even if the rights recognized by the legislation of a Member State on
the subject of industrial and commerical property are not affected, so far
as their existence is concerned, by Articles 85 and 86 of the Treaty, their
exercise may still fall under the prohibitions imposed by those
provisions."
The Community competition rules, therefore, could limit the manner in
which a proprietor exercised his trademark rights.
The European Court's rationale for distinguishing between the exis-
tence and exercise of these rights is that: "Even where Community rules
override national rules in this field, it is far from being the object of Com-
munity rules to prevent national legislation from granting intellectual
property rights and from providing the means, within national boundaries
of enforcing them. '5 2 As a result, the interest of Community law is in
limiting the effect of the exercise of these rights on trade between Mem-
ber States. The exercise of industrial property rights which does not af-
fect intra-Community trade was beyond the Court's concern.
A more useful distinction" than that between the existence and the
exercise of an industrial property right was first introduced by the Euro-
pean Court in Deutsche Grammophon v. Metro-SB-Grossmarkte.5 4 This
distinction involved the concept of the "specific subject matter" or "spe-
cific object" (depending on the translation) of a particular industrial
property right. The European Court distinguished between the specific
subject matter of an industrial property right (which Community law
must respect) and other "adventitious characteristics which have to yield
11 Id. at 81, 1971 Comm. Mkt. L.R. at 272.
11 Id. at 81, 1971 Comm. Mkt. L.R. at 273.
52 Harris, supra note 23, at 532. The author also notes:
Although it has certain validity, there is a hint of sophistry about this distinction;
and unfortunately it has given rise to a contrary sophistry, to the effect that, if the
Court attacks the exercise of a right, it matters little that its existence is
unimpaired: mere existence, without the chance of exercise, so the argument goes,
is a hollow advantage. This would be true if it were the whole of the exercise of
the right which were vitiated by a decision of the Court; but in practice it is
not .... [T]he extent to which Community rules override national rules, at any
rate in terms of the number of infringement cases likely to be affected, is rela-
tively circumscribed.
Id. But see Blok, supra note 37, at 731.
53 The comparison is by Harris, supra note 23, at 532.
1" 1971 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 487, 1971 Comm. Mkt. L.R. 631. The Court has elabo-
rated on this concept. See discussion infra at sections IV and V of text.
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to the rules on the free movement of goods because they do not put that
specific object at issue." 5  The distinction between those rights collec-
tively referred to by the European Court and other rights associated with
industrial property has been succinctly stated:
[T]he Court's definition of the specific subject matter of a particular in-
tellectual property right should be understood not as an isolated descrip-
tion of the purposes for which such a right is afforded to individu-
als-these purposes can only be defined by the national legislators-but
as a description of the extent to which the purposes defined by the na-
tional legislator outweigh the Community's interest in the free movement
of goods.56
Community law will not permit intra-Community trade to be restricted
by the exercise of industrial property rights when such rights do not con-
stitute the specific subject matter of the particular industrial property
right involved.
3. Industrial Property Cases and the Applicability of Articles 85
and 86
The earliest industrial property cases decided by the Court of Justice
involved the application of articles 85 and 86.2 Subsequent developments
shifted the interpretation away from these articles and toward the ex-
press application of article 36. Although the focus of the European
Court's industrial property cases has shifted to article 36, articles 85 and
86 have retained their application to industrial property cases in at least
two ways. They serve as the basis for the competence of the European
Commission to review certain cases, and they apply in cases of the impor-
tation of goods from outside the Community, "because in these cases Ar-
ticles 30-36 neither apply directly nor by analogy." ' This latter situation
is important because articles 30-36 by their terms apply only to intra-
Community trade. They do not apply to trade with countries outside the
Harris, supra note 23, at 532-33. Harris cites, in support, a comment by Judge Mer-
tens de Wilmars of the European Court: "The Court's task is to determine, by its case-law,
the degree to which the exceptions permitted under Article 36 are justified.... The judge at
Luxembourg, like his colleagues in the national courts, means to proceed step by step: extra-
polating case-law is always a risky business." Id. at 517 n.11.
" Blok, supra note 37, at 730.
See Establissements Consten SARL and Grundig-Verkaufs-GmgH v. Commission of
the European Economic Community, 1966 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 299, 1966 Comm. Mkt. L.R.
418. Article 85 prohibits agreements and concerted practices in restraint of intra-Commu-
nity trade. Article 86 addresses single firm trading practices thought to abuse a dominant
position. EEC Treaty, supra note 2, 298 U.N.T.S. at 47-49.
58 Blok, supra note 37, at 732, provides examples of the continued application of arti-
cles 85 and 86 in industrial property cases.
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European Community in the absence of a trade agreement containing a
specific provision on point. 9 Nor do they apply, in general, where a trade
agreement does not expressly invoke the application of articles 30-36 as
interpreted under the EEC Treaty.6 0
4. Community Legislative Responses
The case law discussion following highlights the need for a Commu-
nity-wide resolution of this conflict between Community and national
law, but the legislative responses by the Community institutions are be-
yond the scope of this article. They are noted here in brief only to suggest
the rudimentary level of these attempts to resolve industrial property
rights issues from a Community-wide basis.
The two areas where significant Community legislative developments
have occurred are patents and trademarks. A Convention for the Euro-
pean Patent for the Common Market (known as the Community Patent
Convention) was signed on December 15, 1975.1 "The general purpose of
the Convention is to introduce a unitary patent for the Common Market,
within the framework of the wider Convention on the Grant of European
Patents. 6 2 Article 81(1) of the Community Patent Convention provides a
legislative basis for the exhaustion of rights principle as applied to pat-
ents by the European Court in Centrafarm B.V. v. Sterling Drug, Inc.6 3
The Community Patent Convention is an attempt to provide a thorough
legislative basis for the balancing of the conflicting interests of patent
holders and principles of Community trade. But "areas of conflict will
remain and the case law of the Court . . . has certainly not been
superseded."''
European Community legislation on trademarks is at a more primi-
tive stage.65 The European Commission undertook an extensive study ex-
59 EMI Records Ltd. v. CBS United Kingdom Ltd., 1976 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 811,
[1976] 2 Comm. Mkt. L.R. 235; EMI Records Ltd. v. CBS Graramafon A/S, 1976 E. Comm.
Ct. J. Rep. 871, [1976] 2 Comm. Mkt. L.R. 235; EMI Records Ltd. v. CBS Schailplatten
GmbH, 1976 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep 913, [1976] 2 Comm. Mkt. L.R. 235.
60 Polydor Ltd. & RSO Records Inc. v. Harlequin Record Shops Ltd. & Simons Records
Ltd., 1982 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 329, [1982] 1 Comm. Mkt. L.R. 677. Cf. Pabst & Richarz
K.G. v. Hauptzollamt Oldenbourg, 1982 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 1331, [1983] 3 Comm. Mkt.
L.R. 11; see infra note 103. Regarding the general application of articles 85 and 86, Profes-
sor Dashwood has noted that these articles are more difficult procedurally for plaintiffs than
article 36. D. WYATt & A. DASHWOOD, supra note 7, at 349. See Reischl, supra note 41, at
428-29.
61 19 0. J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 17) 1 (1976).
62 D. WYATT & A. DAsHWOOD, supra note 7, at 342.
63 1974 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 1147, [1974] 2 Comm. Mkt. L.R. 480.
4 D. WYATr & A. DASHWOOD, supra note 7, at 343.
65 See 1 H. Ssrr & P. HERZOG, supra note 6, at 2-160 (Supp. 1983).
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ploring the need for a Community-wide trademark." The study con-
cluded that not all firms require that their trademarks cover the same
geographic scope. 7 The Commission proposed two measures: (1) a direc-
tive, based on article 100, would require the approximation of the trade-
mark laws of the Member States;" and, (2) a proposed Council Regula-
tion on Community Trade Marks, based on article 235, would permit
those firms requiring Community-wide coverage of their trademarks to
register at a new Community Trade Mark Office (CTMO).69 The Regula-
tion would provide that decisions of the CTMO would be reviewable in-
ternally and by the European Court as a last resort.7 0 Professors Herzog
and Smit note that although these proposals would not eliminate the
problems in this area, they would substantially reduce them since firms
seeking Community-wide trademark coverage could opt for registry with
the Community Trade Mark Office.7 1
The problems associated with copyrights and related rights are of
more recent origin. As the following case law discussion demonstrates, a
need exists for Community legislation in this area to resolve conflicts sim-
ilar to, but more complex than the problems associated with trademarks
and patents.
Some of the earliest cases before the European Court dealt with
trademarks. These and subsequent trademark decisions of the European
Court collectively constitute a concise statement of the concepts devel-
oped by the European Court. Hence, the case law discussion will begin
with an analysis of these cases. Decisions regarding patents'will follow.
The newest phase of the European Court's interpretation of article 36
deals with copyrights and related rights and an analysis of these cases will
complete the discussion.
III. TRADEMARKS
The majority of the European Court's case law in industrial property
has involved trademarks. The major developments of the European
Court's case law have been well documented elsewhere.7 2 The essential
as The Need for a European Trademark System: Competence of the European Commu-
nity to Create One, Doc. No. III/D/1294/79 (Oct. 1979) (Commission of European Communi-
ties, Commission Working Paper Working Group on the Community Trademark), reprinted
in 11 INT'L REV. INDUS. PROP. & COPYRIGHT L. (IIC) 58, 174 (1980).
67 Id. at 60.
" 23 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. C 351) 1 (1980).
69 23 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. C 351) 5 (1980).
70 Id. at 18-19.
71 1 H. SMIT & P. HERZOG, supra note 6, at 2-160 (Supp. 1983). The authors also note
the Commission's detailed study exploring the implications of a community trademark. See
Blok, supra note 37, for criticism of the Commission proposals.
72 See, e.g., D. WYATT & A. DASHWOOD, supra note 7; Harris, supra note 23; Usher,
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highlights of the concepts developed by the European Court in its earlier
decisions dealing with intellectual property rights will be discussed to in-
dicate the trends taken by recent developments in the European Court's
jurisprudence.
A. Van Zuylen Freres v. Hag A.G.
The European Court's first trademark decision based squarely on its
interpretation of article 36 was Van Zuylen Freres v. Hag A.G. (Hag).73
In the Hag case,7 4 the original holder of the trademark "Hag" (for a
brand of coffee) controlled the rights to that mark in Germany and
Belgium before World War 11. The trademark holder assigned its Belgian
rights in "Hag" to a Belgian subsidiary. After World War H, the Belgian
trademark rights were acquired by a firm unrelated to the original holder
which had retained control of the German trademark rights. As a result,
there were two unrelated holders of the identical trademark, one in
Belgium and the other in Germany, which had no legal, financial, techni-
cal or economic links between them. Since there was no continuing agree-
ment or concerted practice between the parties, there was no basis for the
application of article 85, which had been the basis of earlier industrial
property rights analysis. The European Court based its decision solely on
its interpretation of article 36 for the first time.
The European Court's judgment in Hag articulated what have now
become established principles. The European Court noted that Commu-
supra note 15.
73 1974 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 731, [1974] 2 Comm. Mkt. L.R. 127. The European Court
had addressed trademarks in the application of article 85 to exclusive distribution agree-
ments in the early case of Consten and Grundig, 1966 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 299, 1966
Comm. MVkt. L.R. 418. The Court also addressed the issue of trademarks by applying article
36 analogously to another competition case. Sirena Srl v. Eda Srl, 1971 E. Comm. Ct. J.
Rep. 69, 1971 Comm. Mkt. L.R. 260. One point in Sirena is worth noting. The Court re-
marked that it may be possible to differentiate between certain categories of industrial
property: other forms of industrial property "are usually more important, and merit a
higher degree of protection, than the interests protected by an ordinary trade-mark." Id. at
82, 1971 Comm. Mkt. L.R. at 273. D. WYATr & A. DASHWOOD, supra note 7, at 347-48,
emphasize that the Court was not establishing a universal rule, but rather indicating its
perception of the normal case. See also Harris, supra note 23, at 521, wherein the author
suggests that the significance of the Court's distinction between trademarks and other rights
is as follows: When a proprietor pleads article 36 as an exception to the free movement of
goods, the proprietor must establish that the "justification" required must be established
by, inter alia, "the category and relative importance of the intellectual property right con-
cerned." Id. As an example, Harris notes that the trademark "Shell" is, in economic terms,
incomparable with a patent, such as that for a device to cut the top off a hard-boiled egg
(U.K. Patent No. BP1 400 835). Id. at 521 n.23.
7, This factual summary is taken from 1974 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. at 732, 743, [1974] 2
Comm. Mkt. L.R. at 129, 143.
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nity law does not affect the existence of an industrial property right,
which is a function of state law, but may affect the exercise of those
rights.75 Article 36 permits a derogation from the fundamental principle
of the free movement of goods, and should be interpreted strictly. 8 A
derogation is possible only to protect what the Court has termed the
"specific subject matter" of an industrial property right 7 the characteris-
tics of which have been more fully articulated in subsequent cases.7 8
In Hag, the nationally created rights which collectively constituted
the specific subject matter of a trademark would have permitted the pro-
prietor of a trademark to enjoin infringement of that right "on the part of
persons who lack any legal title. ' 79 In Hag, however, both the Belgian and
German proprietors held valid legal rights to the same mark, although the
rights of each were derived under different state laws. The European
Court, therefore, concluded:
[The specific subject matter of a trademark did not permit] the holder of
a trademark to rely upon the exclusiveness of a trade mark right, which
may be the consequence of the territorial limitation of national legisla-
tions with a view to prohibiting the marketing in a Member State of
goods legally produced in another Member State under an identical trade
mark having the same origin .... Such a prohibition, which would legi-
timise the isolation of national markets, would collide with one of the
essential objects of the Treaty, which is to unite national markets in a
single market.80
The effect of the Hag decision on the holder of the Belgian trade-
mark rights was to prevent it from exercising its mark to prohibit the
importation of German coffee bearing an identical trademark because the
marks had once been controlled by the same owner. The European Court
justified this limitation on the exercise of the holder's nationally created
trademark rights by the need to avoid partitioning segments of the Com-
mon Market.8 ' The need for this limitation existed especially in the case
of trademarks, unlike other forms of industrial property, because: (1)
trademark rights are of unlimited duration; and, (2) the trademark's util-
ity as a guide to product origin "may be ensured by means other than
such as would affect the free movement of goods" (at least where a single
7 Id. at 743, [1974] 2 Comm. Mkt. L.R. at 143.
76 Id. at 744, [1974] 2 Comm. Mkt. L.R. at 143.
77 Id.
78 See, e.g., Centrafarm B.V. & de Peijper v. Sterling Drug Inc., 1974 E. Comm. Ct. J.
Rep. 1147, [1974] 2 Comm. Mkt. L.R. 480.
79 1974 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. at 744, [1974] 2 Comm. Mkt. L.R. at 143. For discussion
of persons who lack legal title and the categories of persons against whom infringement
actions are likely to be taken, see Harris, supra note 23, at 523.
80 1974 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. at 744, [1974] 2 Comm. Mkt. L.R. at 143-44.
81 Id. at 744, [1974] 2 Comm. Mkt. L.R. at 143.
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mark had been split between unrelated holders).8 2 The Hag decision ar-
ticulated only a bare outline of the specific subject matter of trademarks.
The Court offered a more detailed statement of the specific subject mat-
ter of trademarks in Centrafarm B.V. and de Peijper v. Winthrop B.V.83
B. Centrafarm v. Winthrop
Winthrop involved the parallel importation of pharmaceuticals be-
tween two Member States.8 In Winthrop, the Sterling Drug Corporation
held parallel patents in the United Kingdom and the Netherlands for the
drug marketed under the trade name "Negram." Sterling Drug's British
and Dutch subsidiaries marketed Negram in their respective national
markets. Each subsidiary held the relevant national trademark. The pre-
vailing price for Negram in Britain was substantially lower than that in
the Netherlands. Centrafarm B.V. (Centrafarm), a Dutch pharmaceutical
firm, sought to take advantage of this price differential by importing
Negram originally marketed in the United Kingdom, and reselling it in
the Dutch market. Centrafarm effectively undersold Sterling Drug's
Dutch subsidiary, Winthrop B.V. (Winthrop). Winthrop sought to enjoin
Centrafarm from marketing Negram in the Netherlands on the basis that
Centrafarm was infringing Winthrop's Dutch trademark rights. The
Netherlands court referred a question of the interpretation of Community
law to the European Court under article 177.5
82 Id. at 744, [1974] 2 Comm. Mkt. L.R. at 144. Harris, supra note 23, at 524 n.35,
wherein the author argues that alternative information on product packaging is seldom as
effective in denoting product origin as a trademark. The Court apparently considers it suffi-
ciently effective. See Pfizer, Inc. v. Eurim-Pharm GmbH, 1981 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 2913,
[1982] 1 Comm. Mkt. L.R. 406. See Hendry, Repackaging and the Essential Function of
Trade-Marks, 7 EUR. L. R.v. 403 (1982).
e 1974 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 1183, [1974] 2 Comm. Mkt. L.R. 480.
4 For a factual summary, see id. at 1185, [1974] 2 Comm. Mkt. L.R. at 484-85. Its
companion case, discussed in section IV on Patents, is Sterling, 1974 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep.
1174, [1974] 2 Comm. Mkt. L.R. 480.
11 The text of article 177 is as follows:
The Court of Justice shall be competent to make a preliminary decision
concerning
(a) the interpretation of this Treaty;,
(b) the validity and interpretation of acts of the institutions of the Commu-
nity; and
(c) the interpretation of the statutes of any bodies set up by an act of the
Council, where such statutes so provide.
Where any such question is raised before a court or tribunal of one of the
Member States, such court or tribunal may, if it considers that its judgment de-
pends on a preliminary decision on this question, request the Court of Justice to
give a ruling thereon.
Where any such question is raised in a case pending before a domestic court
or tribunal from whose decisions no appeal lies under municipal law, such court or
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The European Court responded by essentially repeating the princi-
ples it had established in Deutsche Grammophonse (an earlier copyright
case discussed below) and Hag.87 The European Court held that Commu-
nity law does not affect the existence of national trademark law, but may
restrict its exercise to preserve the free movement of goods within the
Community.8s Article 36 permits an exception to the free movement of
goods, but only to protect the specific subject matter of the trademark, 9
which the European Court held to be:
[T]he guarantee that the owner of the trade mark has the exclusive right
to use that trade mark for the purpose of putting products into circula-
tion for the first time, and is therefore intended to protect him against
competitors wishing to take advantage of the status and reputation of
the trade mark by selling products illegally bearing that trade mark.9
The European Court's response emphasized the commercial return
due the trademark holder, as a reward for its marketing investments,
rather than, as in Hag, on the protection of the product origin to the
consumer or ultimate user." (This may have been a result of the different
factual situations presented by the two cases, rather than due to a shift in
the Court's emphasis on the specific subject matter of trademarks.2 )
The effect of the Winthrop decision was to prevent Winthrop, Ster-
ling Drug's Dutch subsidiary, from enjoining Centrafarm's importation of
Negram into the Netherlands. The European Court justified this result
by stating that it must balance the need to protect certain aspects of na-
tional trademark rights while protecting the free movement of goods. The
Court reasoned:
An obstacle to the free movement of goods may arise out of the exis-
tence, within a national legislation concerning industrial and commercial
tribunal shall refer the matter to the Court of Justice.
EEC Treaty, supra note 2, 298 U.N.T.S. at 76-77.
Except for a relatively small number of actions which originate at the European Court,
known as direct actions, cases come before the European Court by referral from a national
court. If a question of interpretation of Community law arises in a national court, that court
can and in some cases must refer that question to the European Court for an interpretation
by that body. The European Court renders an interpretation of the Community law in ques-
tion in light of the facts of the case before the referring national court, but it is solely for the
national court to apply the European Court's interpretation to the facts of the case. See A.
MACKENZIE-STUART, THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES AND THE RULE OF LAW (1977).
:' See 1971 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 487, 1971 Comm. Mkt. L.R. 631.
87 1974 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 731, [1974] 2 Comm. Mkt. L.R. 127.
1974 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. at 1194, [1974] 2 Comm. Mkt. L.R. at 503.
I9 !d.
90 Id. at 1194, [1974] 2 Comm. Mkt. L.R. at 508.
91 Id.
92 See D. WYATT & A. DASHWOOD, supra note 7, at 353.
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property of provisions laying down that a trade mark owner's right is not
exhausted when the product protected by the trade mark is marketed in
another Member State, with the result that the trade mark owner can
prevent importation of the product into his own Member State when it
has been marketed in another Member State. Such an obstacle is not
justified when the product has been put onto the market in a legal man-
ner in the Member State from which it has been imported, by the trade
mark owner himself or with his consent, so that there can be no question
of abuse or infringement of the trade markY3
The trademark owner's collective rights, include the right to market the
trademarked goods somewhere in the Community prior to a third party.
The holder's rights could not include the right to create submarkets
within the Community, each supporting a different pricing structure, by
assigning its rights to different persons within such submarkets.94 The ex-
tent of the geographic scope of the market to which article 36 applied was
considered in a series of cases known as the EMI v. CBS cases.9
C. EMI v. CBS
The EMI v. CBS cases involved trademark infringement proceedings
brought by EMI in the United Kingdom, Denmark and Germany to en-
join the importation into those states of records bearing the trademark
"Columbia." The records had been manufactured by CBS in the United
States.
Some years earlier, the world rights to the trademark "Columbia"
had been assigned to different parties. At the time of these proceedings,
EMI Records controlled the rights to "Columbia" throughout the Mem-
ber States of the Community, while CBS held the American rights. There
were no continuing agreements between EMI and CBS.9" The respective
93 1974 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. at 1194-95, [1974] 2 Comm. Mkt. L.R. at 508-09.
" Professor Usher, in assessing the importance of both Hag and Winthrop, has written:
[W]hat in reality Hag does, although it had the misfortune chronologically to be
decided before Centrafarm [Winthrop], is to apply the Centrafarm principle to
successors in title .... Just as a patentee or trade mark holder may not exercise
his rights to prevent the sale in a Member State of goods marketed in another
Member State by him or with his consent, so also it would appear that his succes-
sors in title cannot claim greater rights. The owner of an industrial property right
cannot evade the restrictions on the exercise of his right by splitting it and grant-
ing its benefits to different assignees in different Member States.
Usher, supra note 15, at 46.
" EMI Records Ltd. v. CBS United Kingdom Ltd., 1976 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 811,
[1976] 2 Comm. Mkt. L.R. 235; EMI Records Ltd. v. CBS Grammafon A/S, 1976 E. Comm.
Ct. J. Rep. 871, [1976] 2 Comm. Mkt. L.R. 235; EMI Records Ltd. v. CBS Schallplatten
GmbH, 1976 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 913, [1976] 2 Comm. Mkt. L.R. 235.
"The cases involved an analysis of article 85(1) because CBS claimed, unsuccessfully,
that the trademark agreements were part of a concerted practice to partition the world mar-
1984
CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L.
national courts each referred the interpretation of article 36 to the Euro-
pean Court which considered, inter alia, the extent of the geographic area
to which article 36 applied.
Whereas Hag involved goods legally produced in another Member
State under identical trademarks having a common origin,97 and Win-
throp involved the application of the exhaustion of rights doctrine to
goods marketed in another Member State by the trademark holder, 8
EMI raised the issue of whether the common origin doctrine (derived
from Hag) and the exhaustion of rights doctrine (derived from Winthrop)
applied when one of the products had been lawfully manufactured
outside the Community.9 CBS argued that the common origin doctrine
of Hag prohibited EMI from enjoining its marketing of "Columbia"
marked records, which, although manufactured in the United States, bore
a mark once held by the same proprietor as the mark now controlled by
EMI.
The European Court rejected CBS' argument and held that the EEC
Treaty applied only to trade between Member States not to trade be-
tween Member States and third countries. Consequently:
[T]he exercise of a trade mark right in order to prevent the marketing of
products coming from a third country under an identical mark, even if
this constitutes an effect equivalent to a quantitative restriction, does
not affect the free movement of goods between Member States and thus
does not come under the prohibitions set out (in Articles 30-36 of the
Treaty).10 0
The scope of the geographic market to which articles 30-36 apply "is the
internal single market, a single market of trade between Member
States. 101
In EMI, the common origin of the trademark was irrelevant. No
question of partitioning trade between Member States could arise be-
tween a manufacturer outside the Community and one controlling the
trademark rights for the entire Community. The specific subject matter
of trademarks permitted EMI, in principle, therefore, to enjoin the im-
portation of records manufactured by CBS in the United States bearing
the trademark "Columbia." Even had CBS sought to manufacture the
records in the Community, the European Court concluded, the result
would have been the same:
ket, a practice prohibited by article 85(1).
See supra note 74 and accompanying text.
"See supra note 84 and accompanying text.
See Usher, supra note 15, at 47.
100 1976 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. at 845, [1976] 2 Comm. Mkt. L. R. at 265.
101 Usher, supra note 15, at 47.
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[T]he protection of industrial and commercial property established by
Article 36 would be rendered meaningless if an undertaking other than
the proprietor of a mark in the Member States could be allowed there to
manufacture and market products bearing the same mark since such con-
duct would amount to an actual infringement of the protected mark.10 2
To have allowed the marketing of "Columbia" records by CBS would
have deprived EMI of its right to protect the specific subject matter of its
trademark, that is, EMI's right first to market "Columbia" records within
the Community.103
D. Terrapin v. Terranova
One question that remained after Winthrop, Hag and EMI was
whether the common origin doctrine would be applied to prevent the im-
portation of products bearing the same or similar trademark, but which
marks were acquired by unrelated proprietors in different Member
States. The European Court's landmark0 decision in Terrapin (Over-
seas) Ltd. v. Fa. Terranova Industrie and A. Kapferer & Co."0 5 held that
the common origin doctrine prohibited such an import practice. The Ter-
rapin case contained a more precise definition of the specific subject mat-
ter of trademarks and a synthesis of the European Court's prior law con-
cerning industrial property rights.
In Terrapin, the German proprietor of the trademark "Terranova"
sought to enjoin the importation into Germany of British-manufactured
products bearing the mark "Terrapin." Terranova argued in the German
proceedings, and subsequently before the European Court, that "Terra-
02 1976 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. at 847, [1976] 2 Comm. Mkt. L.R. at 266.
103 The European Court has recently addressed the scope of the market to which arti-
cles 30-36 apply. Polydor Ltd. & RSO Records Inc. v. Harlequin Record Shops Ltd. &
Simons Records Ltd., 1982 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 329, [1982] 1 Comm. Mkt. L.R. 677. This
case involved trade in trademarked records between Portugal and the EEC and the inter-
pretation of an EEC-Portugal trade agreement. One of the terms of the agreement was al-
most identical to article 30. The Court held that the case law principles developed under
article 30 did not apply to the provision in the almost identically worded agreement with
Portugal. Id. at 348-49, [1982] 1 Comm. Mkt. L.R. at 692-93. See Bronckers, Transposing
the Interpretation of EEC Treaty Concepts to Agreements Between the EEC and Third
Countries-Exhaustion of Industrial and Intellectual Property Rights, 76 AM. J. INV'L L.
857 (1982). Cf. Pabst & Richarz K.G. v. Hauptzollamt Oldenbourg, 1982 E. Comm. Ct. J.
Rep. 1331, [1983] 3 Comm. Mkt. L.R. 11. Pabst involved a similarly worded provision in a
trade agreement with Greece. The EEC case law developed under article 30 applied. For an
analysis of the different results, see Bronckers, supra, at 862; Schermers, The Direct Appli-
cation of Treaties with Third States: Note Concerning the Polydor and Pabst Cases, 19
COMMON MKT. L. Rv. 563 (1982).
1I" The description is from Harris, supra note 23, at 527.
105 1976 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 1039, [1976] 2 Comm. Mkt. L.R. 482. See id. at 1041,
[1976] 2 Comm. Mkt. L.R. at 484-85 for a factual summary.
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pin" and "Terranova" were confusingly similar under German trademark
law. As a consequence, Terranova's sales and goodwill would be
prejudiced by the continued importation into Germany of goods trade-
marked "Terrapin." There was no relationship between the trademark
holders, nor was there a common origin to the marks, which were sepa-
rately developed under different national laws.
In proceedings before the European Court, the Court of Justice noted
that the determination of whether the marks were confusingly similar was
for the national court.100 The European Court cautioned the German
court, however, that in making such a determination it could not permit a
trademark holder to exercise its rights so as to create an "arbitrary dis-
crimination or a disguised restriction on trade between Member
States." 0 7 As a guide to the German court, the European Court stated
that the German court should consider whether the trademark holder ex-
ercised its rights "with the same degree of strictness whatever the na-
tional origin of any possible infringer."' 08 Impliedly, the European Court
stated that inconsistent enforcement of its trademark rights could consti-
tute a prohibited restriction on intra-Community trade, depending on the
facts of the selective enforcement of its rights.
The European Court synthesized its previous interpretations of the
specific subject matter of trademarks by restating, in more general terms,
the principles developed in Hag and Winthrop. European Court reiter-
ated the exhaustion of rights doctrine from Winthrop: the trademark
holder cannot exercise its rights so as to prevent the importation into one
Member State of products lawfully marketed in another Member State,
by the holder or with his consent.109 The exhaustion of rights doctrine
applied "when the right relied upon is the result of the subdivision either
by voluntary act [as in Winthrop] or as a result of public constraint of a
trade mark right which originally belonged to one and the same proprie-
tor [as in Hag]."2 0 The European Court underscored its statement from
Hag that a basic function of the trademark was to guarantee to consum-
ers the genuineness of the product origin. But the Court added that
where a single trademark had been subdivided, the guarantee of origin "is
already undermined.""'
The common origin doctrine from Hag did not, however, apply in
Terrapin because the trademarks had no common origin; they had been
1-0 Id. at 1060, [1976] 2 Comm. Mkt. L.R. at 505.
207 Id.
108 Id.
109 Id. at 1061, [1976] 2 Comm. Mkt. L.R. at 505-06.
110 Id. (referring to the factual situation in Hag).
212 Id. See D. WYATr & A. DASHWOOD, supra note 7, at 356-57, wherein the authors note
that this statement completes the rationale developed originally by the Court in Hag, 1974
E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 731, [1974] 2 Comm. Mkt. L.R. 127.
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independently acquired by different proprietors under the laws of differ-
ent Member States.11 2 The European Court concluded that given "the
present state of Community law," a trademark holder could prohibit the
importation of goods bearing a mark considered, under the law of the
state of importation, to be confusingly similar to a mark already there in
force.113 Otherwise, "the specific objective of industrial and commercial
property rights would be undermined.' 1 4 The confusing similarity of the
imported goods would prevent the trademark holder in the state of im-
portation from exercising his exclusive right to the first marketing of the
trademarked products.11 5
Although the Terrapin decision synthesized the European Court's
prior case law, it raised several new questions that remain as yet un-
resolved. One such question is to what extent are differing national stan-
dards compatible with the free movement of goods? 126
E. Hoffmann-LaRoche v. Centrafarm and Centrafarm v. American
Home Products Corp.
In two 1978 cases, Hoffmann-LaRoche & Co. A.G. v. Centrafarm
Vertriebsgesellschaft (HLR)1"7 and Centrafarm Vertriebsgesellschaft v.
American Home Products Corp. (AHPC) ,11' the European Court was
faced with two market rivals which sought to enjoin Centrafarm from re-
packaging and reselling their trademarked drugs.
In HLR,'19 the Swiss-based pharmaceutical firm, Hoffmann-LaRoche,
manufactured the Diazepam tranquilizer bearing the trademark
"Valium." Subsidiaries of Hoffmann-LaRoche in West Germany and
Britain each marketed Valium in their respective countries. Prices for
'" 1976 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. at 1041, [1976] 2 Comm. Mkt. L.R. at 484-85.
213 Id. at 1061, [1976] 2 Comm. Mkt. L.R. at 505-06.
114 Id. at 1061-62, [1976] 2 Comm. Mkt. L.R. 506.
11" The European Court reasoned that:
In the particular situation the requirements of the free movement of goods and
the safeguarding of industrial and commercial property rights must be so recon-
ciled that protection is ensured for the legitimate use of the rights conferred by
national laws, coming within the prohibitions on imports "justified" within the
meaning of Article 36 of the Treaty, but denied on the other hand in respect of
any improper exercises of the same rights of such a nature as to maintain or effect
artificial partitions within the common market.
Id. at 1062, [1976] 2 Comm. Mkt. L.R. at 506.
116 Usher, supra note 15, at 47; see Dansk Supermarked A/S v. Imerco A/S, 1981 E.
Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 181, [1981] 3 Comm. Mkt. L.R. 590. For a discussion of this case, see
infra notes 254-74 and accompanying text.
117 1978 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 1139, [1978] 3 Comm. Mkt. L.R. 217.
18 1978 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 1823, [1979] 1 Comm. Mkt. L.R. 326.
11 See 1978 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. at 1141-42, [1978] 3 Comm. Mkt. L.R. at 219-20 for a
factual summary.
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Valium in Britain were substantially lower than those prevailing in Ger-
many. The German subsidiary of Centrafarm purchased quantities of
Valium in the United Kingdom, repackaged it in different containers in
the Netherlands, and resold it in Germany. In so doing, Centrafarm re-
affixed Hoffmann-LaRoche's mark on the new container with an indica-
tion that it had been repackaged by Centrafarm. Centrafarm acted with-
out the permission of Hoffmann-LaRoche which, therefore sought to en-
join Centrafarm in a suit filed in the Netherlands. The Dutch court
referred the interpretation of article 36 to the European Court.
In AHPC,120 Centrafarm went even farther. American Home Prod-
ucts Corporation of New York controlled undertakings in the United
Kingdom and the Netherlands. The British firm held the U.K. trademark
rights in "Serenid D" and the Dutch firm held the rights for "Seresta."
The different marks were for nearly identical drugs whose therapeutic ef-
fects were identical. Centrafarm attempted to circumvent American
Home Products Corporation's international brand differentiation by im-
porting the lower priced Serenid from Britain into the Netherlands. Cen-
trafarm then relabelled it "Seresta" and marketed it in the Netherlands,
Belgium and Luxembourg. The new labels informed purchasers of the re-
packaging. Centrafarm again had acted without permission from the orig-
inal drug manufacturer. American Home Products Corporation sought to
enjoin Centrafarm in Dutch proceedings and the Dutch court referred the
interpretation of article 36 to the European Court.
In HLR, the European Court held that under article 36(1) a holder
was entitled to exercise its trademark rights to limit trade between Mem-
ber States to prevent "a product to which the trade mark has lawfully
been applied in one of those states from being marketed in the other
Member State after it has been repacked in new packaging to which the
trade mark has been affixed by a third party [without the holder's
consent]."'1 21
The European Court's decision again restated its familiar distinction
between the functions of Community law and national law. The existence
of an industrial property right is a function of state law, whereas the exer-
cise of such a right may be restricted by Community law.'12 Article 36
permits exceptions to the free movement of goods only to protect the spe-
cific subject matter of individual property rights. The specific subject
matter of a trademark is the holder's exclusive right to the trademarked
good's first marketing within the Community, by himself or with his
120 See 1978 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. at 1824-25, [1979] 1 Comm. Mkt. L.R. at 328-29 for a
factual summary.
12 1978 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. at 1166, [1978] 3 Comm. Mkt. L.R. at 243.
22 Id. at 1163, [1978] 3 Comm. Mkt. L.R. at 240-41.
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consent.'
1 2
The European Court in HLR further concluded that the essential
function of the trademark was "a test of whether a given right falls within
the category of specific subject matter.'1 24 The Court described the essen-
tial function of a trademark as a guarantee of "the identity of the origin
of the trade marked product to the consumer or ultimate user, by ena-
bling him without any possibility of confusion to distinguish that product
from products which have another origin. 1 25 The purpose of the guaran-
tee of origin is to ensure the consumer that:
[A] trade marked product which is sold to him has not been subject at a
previous stage of marketing to interference by a third person, without
the authorization of the proprietor of the trade mark, such as to affect
the original condition of the product.12
The trademark holder, therefore, has the right to limit intra-Community
trade in his marked products to prevent third parties from impairing the
guarantee of origin of his products.
The European Court qualified this general rule, however, in an at-
tempt to balance the interests of consumers in being assured of a prod-
uct's origin with the rights of trademark holders to the first marketing of
a product within the Community. The European Court hypothesized that
trademark rights could be used as part of a marketing strategy designed
to partition segments of the Common Market.127 Such a use was not pro-
tected by the exception to the free movement of goods contemplated by
article 36.
The European Court concluded that if a trademark is so used, the
mark holder could not prohibit trade in his marked product if three con-
ditions were met: (1) the repackaging by a third party was done so that it
could not affect the original condition of the product; (2) the proprietor of
the mark received advance notice of the marketing of the repackaged
goods; and, (3) the new package stated by whom the product had been
repackaged. 2 8
In both HLR and AHPC, Centrafarm repackaged goods purchased in
223 Id. at 1164, [1978] 3 Comm. Mkt. L.R. at 241.
124 D. WYATr & A. DASHWOOD, supra note 7, at 358.
122 1978 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. at 1164, [1978] 3 Comm. Mkt L.R. at 241. See D. WYATr
& A. DASWOOD, supra note 7, at 358-59, wherein the authors note a certain "inelegance in
juxtaposing" the consumer's guarantee of origin with the specific subject matter of the
trademark holder's right to first market the goods. Professor Dashwood synthesized the
Court's statement here with its decisions in Hag and Terrapin, concluding that the Court
tried to repair any imbalance in its policies toward trademark protection created by those
earlier decisions.
128 1978 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. at 1164, [1978] 3 Comm. Mkt. L.R. at 241.
127 Id. at 1166, [1978] 3 Comm. Mkt. L.R. at 243.
128 Id.
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one country and affixed the mark held by the original manufacturer in
the country into which the goods were exported. In HLR, the trademarks
were identical whereas in AHPC, the marks were different.
In AHPC, the European Court reiterated the basic points outlined in
HLR. The specific subject matter of trademarks was to guarantee to the
proprietor his exclusive right to the first marketing of his products in the
Community. This right is the trademark holder's "protection against
competitors wishing to take advantage of the status and reputation of the
mark by selling products illegally bearing that trade mark.' 1 29
The European Court reasoned that the scope of this exclusive right
may be determined by the essential function of trademarks. In AHPC, as
in HLR, the essential function of the trademark was "to guarantee the
identity of origin of the trade marked product to the consumer or ulti-
mate user. 12 0 That guarantee is destroyed when a third party places the
proprietor's mark on the product without its consent. It is, therefore, con-
sistent with the essential function of a trademark that, where a proprietor
holds two or more marks with respect to identical or similar products,
national law should prohibit a third party from altering or replacing the
trademarks. This applies even where a proprietor holds different marks in
different Member States.'3 '
The Court hypothesized, however, that the control of different trade-
mark rights for similar products in various Member States could be
manipulated to restrict trade within the Community, which is prohibited
under article 36.132 Whether trademark rights had been so used in a par-
ticular case was an issue to be resolved by the national court."33 The Eu-
ropean Court acknowledged that it was legal to engage in international
brand differentiation under certain market conditions."M Such a practice
could, however, be used as part of marketing strategy designed within the
Community. In such a case, the proprietor could not exercise his trade-
mark rights to prohibit a third party from so affixing his mark."35
The European Court's reference in AHPC to the intentional use of a
1219 1978 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. at 1840, [1979] 1 Comm Mkt. L.R. at 342.
23 Id. at 1840, [1979] 1 Comm. Mkt. L.R. at 342-43.
131 Id. at 1840-41, [1979] 1 Comm. Mkt. L.R. at 343.
132 Id. at 1841-42, [1979] 1 Comm. Mkt. L.R. at 343.
I- Id. at 1842, [1979] 1 Comm. Mkt. L.R. at 343.
13 D. WYATt & A. DASHWOOD, supra note 7, at 360, wherein the authors note that this
may be so where the trademark used in one Member State cannot be acquired by the same
manufacturer in another Member State because it is confusingly similar to one already in
force in the second Member State.
135 1978 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. at 1841-42, [1979] 1 Comm. Mkt. L.R. at 343. For a
critical comment on the effect of this decision and HLR from an economic perspective, see
Fuller, Economic Issues Relating to Property Rights in Trademarks: Export Bans, Differ-
ential Pricing, Restrictions on Resale and Repackaging, 6 EUR. L. REv. 162 (1981).
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marketing strategy to partition market segments was more direct than in
the hypothetical situation discussed in HLR. This raised the as yet unan-
swered question of whether the test for a disguised restriction on trade is
subjective or objective. In HLR, the European Court referred to effects on
the market, an objective standard. 136 The European Court in AHPC con-
centrated on intentional marketing strategy, a subjective standard. 13 7 The
European Court has addressed this question in its latest trademark case,
Pfizer, Inc. v. Eurim-Pharm GmbH.138
F. Pfizer, Inc. v Eurim-Pharm GmbH
Pfizer can be construed as essentially a continuation of the prior case
law and merely'explains the essential function of trademarks, which is to
protect product origin. Pfizer is consistent with other recent cases 3 9
which narrow industrial property right holders' ability to hinder intra-
Community trade through the exercise of their respective property rights.
Pfizer1 40 involved the importation of pharmaceuticals from England
into Germany. Pfizer was an American firm holding the trademark rights
to the drug Vibramycin throughout the European Community. British
and West German subsidiaries of Pfizer each held the respective national
trademarks to Vibramycin and distributed the drug within their respec-
tive countries.
Eurim-Pharm GmbH was an importer operating in West Germany. It
purchased lower priced quantities of Vibramycin in the United Kingdom,
repackaged the drug and marketed it in West Germany in competition
with Pfizer's subsidiary. The large price differential for the drug in the
two markets, as in the Centrafarm cases, was the trade incentive.
Pfizer packaged its Vibramycin in Britian in "blister" sheets contain-
ing five capsules individually protected by plastic blisters or bubbles on
each sheet. Either two or ten of these sheets were enclosed in each
container. To conform to different prescription practices in Germany,
Eurim-Pharm repacked the blister sheets individually. It left the sealed
capsules and sheets intact. Eurim-Pharm's new outer container was clear
on one side permitting the back portion of the original sheets, on which
the original manufacturer's trademark was printed, to show through. The
outer container clearly indicated the name of the original manufacturer,
the name of the importer, and the fact that the sheets were repackaged
186 1978 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. at 1164-65, [1978] 3 Comm. Mkt. L.R. at 241-42.
137 1978 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. at 1841-42, [1979] 1 Comm. Mkt. L.R. at 343.
138 1982 E. Comm. Ct. J.Rep. 2913, [1982] 1 Comm. Mkt. L.R. 406; see Hendry, supra
note 82.
19 See infra at sections IV and V in text.
140 See 1982 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. at 2914-15, [1982] 1 Comm. Mkt. L.R. at 407-09 for a
factual summary.
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by Eurim-Pharm.
Pfizer's German subsidiary sought to enjoin Eurim-Pharm's conduct
in German proceedings on the grounds that Eurim-Pharm's repackaging
had infringed Pfizer's trademark rights under German law. The German
regional court in Hamburg (the Landgericht) held for Pfizer's subsidiary
and granted it an injunction.""' The Landgericht characterized the "pack-
age" to which German trademark law applied as the "unit" formed by the
product and its outer packing. 42 Because Pfizer's original trademark
showed through Eurim-Pharm's new package, it constituted an integral
part of the "unit" and was, therefore, a violation of Pfizer's trademark.
The Landgericht reasoned that the essential function of trademarks
under Community law, the guarantee of origin to the customer, also ap-
plied to this complete "unit." The Landergericht further held that Pfizer
had exhausted its trademark rights within the meaning of Community
law only with regard to the mark affixed on the outer packing. It still
retained, therefore, its rights with respect to the mark affixed on the in-
ner packing.
The Landgericht relied on its interpretation of the European Court's
decisions in HLR and AHPC. It interpreted AHPC to require that Pfizer
must have had the subjective intent to partition segments of the Commu-
nity market to fall within the prohibition of article 36 against "disguised
restrictions" or "arbitrary discriminations" on trade between Member
States. 43
Eurim-Pharm appealed this adverse decision to the Hanseatic Re-
gional Court of Appeal in Germany (the Oberlandesgericht) which re-
versed and remanded. 4 4 The appeals court ruled that Eurim-Pharm's re-
packaging did not interfere with the guarantee of the product's origin.
The consumer could clearly see the original trademark on the blister
sheets and could note the fact that the drug had been repacked and by
whom. It was also obvious to the appeals court that the original factory
seal around the capsules had not been altered or interfered with. Conse-
quently, Eurim-Pharm had not interfered with the consumer's guarantee
of product origin or quality.
The appeals court reversed the lower court finding that subjective
intent to partition a segment of the Community market was required to
constitute a disguised restriction on trade. It was sufficient, held the
Oberlandesgericht, that the measures which had the effect of partitioning
141 For a summary of the Landgericht judgment of Aug. 10, 1979, see id. at 2915-16,
[1982] 1 Comm. Mkt. L.R. at 408-09.
142 Id. at 2916, [1982] 1 Comm. Mkt. L.R. at 409.
143 Id.
144 For a summary of the Oberlandesgericht judgment of Jan. 24, 1980, see id. at 2916-
17, [1982] 1 Comm. Mkt. L.R. at 409-10.
Vol. 16:381
INDUSTRIAL PROPERTY RIGHTS
the market were attributable to the owner of the trademark and were of
an arbitrary nature. No specific intent to partition the market was
required.
On remand from the Oberlandesgericht, the Landgericht challenged
this interpretation of Community law and, therefore, referred two ques-
tions to the European Court: (1) whether the prohibition by a trademark
holder of the type of repackaging undertaken by Eruim-Pharm145 is con-
sistent with article 36; and, (2) whether the test for establishing a dis-
guised restriction on trade among the Member States, within the meaning
of article 36(2), was objective or subjective.14 6
The European Court answered the first question by denying, in prin-
ciple, Pfizer's right to exercise its German trademark so as to enjoin
Eruim-Pharm's conduct.147 Holding that its answer to the first question
was sufficient to permit the Landgericht to dispose of the issues before
it, 148 the European Court did not address the second question.
The parties in Pfizer, both before the European Court and in state
court proceedings, generally agreed on the applicable law. The European
Court, therefore, essentially restated its jurisprudence, principally from
HLR and AHPC: the importance of the free movement of goods, en-
shrined in articles 30-36, is well established. Article 36 accepts that the
protection of industrial property rights constitutes an exception to that
fundamental principle, but only insofar as the measures taken to protect
145 Id. at 2918, [1982] 1 Comm. Mkt. L.R. at 411. The full text is as follows:
1. Is the proprietor of a trade mark protected in his favour in member-State A
entitled under Article 36 of the EEC Treaty, in reliance upon this right, to pre-
vent an importer from buying pharmaceutical products to which the proprietor's
trade mark has been lawfully affixed by a subsidiary undertaking of the proprietor
of the trade mark with his consent in member-State B of the Community and
which have been placed on the market under this trade mark, from re-manufac-
turing those products in accordance with the different practices of doctors in pre-
scribing medicaments prevailing in member-State A and from placing those prod-
ucts on the market in member-State A in an outer package designed by the
importer on the reverse side of which there is a transparent window through
which is visible the label of the proprietor of the trade mark which is on the re-
verse side of the blister pack directly surrounding the product?
140 Id. The text is as follows:
2. Is it sufficient, for the purpose of establishing that there is an unlawful restric-
tion of trade within the meaning of the second sentence of Article 36 of the EEC
Treaty, for the use of the national trade mark right in connection with the mar-
keting system adopted by the proprietor of the trade mark objectively to lead to a
partitioning of the markets between member-States, or is it necessary, on the con-
trary, for it to be shown that the proprietor of the trade mark exercises his trade
mark right in connection with the marketing system which he employs with the
ultimate objective of bringing about an artificial partitioning of the markets?
247 Id. at 2925-27, [1982] 1 Comm. Mkt. L.R. at 420-21.
248 Id. at 2927, [1982] 1 Comm. Mkt. L.R. at 421.
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such rights are necessary to protect the specific subject matter of the in-
tellectual property rights involved. 149 In the case of trademarks, the spe-
cific subject matter is the holder's exclusive right to the first marketing of
the trademarked goods in a Member State. This protects the holder from
competition from those who would take unfair advantage of the status
and reputation of the mark. 50 The European Court stated that the spe-
cific subject matter of a trademark is its essential function:
[T]o guarantee the identity of the origin of the trade-marked product to
the consumer or final user by enabling him to distinguish without any
possibility of confusion between that product and products which have
another origin. This guarantee of origin means that the consumer or final
user may be certain that a trade-marked product which is offered to him
has not been subject at a previous stage in the marketing process to in-
terference by a third person, without the authorisation of the proprietor
of the trade mark, affecting the original condition of the product.15'
Whereas the parties in Pfizer had generally agreed on the applicable
law, they disagreed on its application. Pfizer relied principally on the Eu-
ropean Court's holding in HLR that a trademark holder could prevent an
importer from repackaging and reaffixing the holder's mark without his
consent. 152 Eurim-Pharm distinguished HLR by contending that it had
not reaffixed Pfizer's mark, but had merely displayed it as originally
placed on the product by the manufacturer. 5 3
Advocate-General Capotorti' 54 and the.European Commission agreed
with Eurim-Pharm. The Commission contended that one who did no
19 Id. at 2925, [1982] 1 Comm. Mkt. L.R. at 420.
280 Id. at 2931, [1982] 1 Comm. Mkt. L.R. at 413.
151 Id. at 2926, [1982] 1 Comm. Mkt. L.R. at 420.
152 Id. at 2925, [1982] 1 Comm. Mkt. L.R. at 420. See 1978 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. at
1164, [1978] 3 Comm. Mkt. L.R. at 241; 1978 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. at 1840, [1979] 1 Comm.
Mkt. L.R. at 342.
153 1982 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. at 2916-17, [1982] 1 Comm. Mkt. L.R. at 409-10.
15 An Advocate-General is an officer of the European Court. There are five, chosen
from among the same body of jurists and legal scholars as are the members of the European
Court itself. The status of the Advocate-General, in terms of protocol is equivalent to the
members of the court. The Advocate-General is analagous to the Commissar du Gouverne-
ment before the French Conseil d'Etat, the supreme French administrative court. The func-
tion of the Advocate-General, like that of the Commissar du Gouvernement, is to present a
balanced, judicial perspective to the members of the European Court, in addition to the
submissions presented in each case by the parties thereto. One Advocate-General is assigned
to each case. The status of the Advocate-General's opinion, which is formally printed along-
side the European Court's, is uncertain. It is similar in form to a concurring or dissenting
opinion in U.S. practice, and may be cited as persuasive authority on a point of Community
law. Because all of the opinions of the European Court itself are rendered in banc, the
Advocate-General's opinion is the only personally identifiable opinion available on a point
of Community law. See T. HARTLEY, supra note 5, at 29; D. LASOK & J. BRIDGE, supra note
5, at 158-60.
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more than present the trademark as originally affixed by the manufac-
turer did not affix the mark within the meaning of HLR.'5 5 Advocate-
General Capotorti supported this view with the Court's statement from
HLR,15 to the effect that the repackaging by a third party would be per-
mitted if done in such a way as to leave unaffected the original condition
of the product. 57 The Advocate-General also raised the issue whether,
assuming Pfizer's argument that article 36(1) permitted it to enjoin
Eurim-Pharm's activity, Pfizer's conducted nevertheless a disguised re-
striction on trade prohibited by article 36(2).
The European Court based its decision in Pfizer solely on its inter-
pretation of the essential function of trademarks. The European Court
held that the product origin could not be compromised "where the im-
porter, in re-packaging the product, confined himself to replacing the ex-
ternal wrapping without touching the internal packaging."15 "In such
circumstances, the re-packaging . . . involves no risk of exposing the
product to interference or influences which might affect its original condi-
tion ....
Under these circumstances, the European Court held that the con-
sumer would not be misled as to the product origin, especially where "the
parallel importer [had] clearly indicated on the external wrapping that
the product was manufactured by a subsidiary of the proprietor of the
trade mark and [had] been re-packaged by the importer." 6 0
The European Court has, therefore, extended its holding in HLR.'6 1
The Court's dictum in HLR suggested that the holder of a marked prod-
uct could not prohibit repackaging (that did not affect the product origin)
only where the holder's marketing strategy was used to partition the mar-
ket which would constitute a disguised restriction on trade prohibited
under article 36(2).182 The European Court's decision in HLR stated, in
dictum, that a third party's notice to the trademark holder, prior to re-
packaging, was a requirement. Pfizer required no notice to the trademark
holder. The European Court was concerned less with the commercial ef-
fect of the repackaging on the holder, and concentrated on insuring an
informed purchase by the consumer and the free availability of goods
throughout the Community. The effect of Pfizer is to limit further the
ability of a trademark holder to protect his marked products when that
conduct hinders trade between Member States.
165 1982 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. at 2932-36, [1982] 1 Comm. Mkt. L.R. at 414-18.
168 1978 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. at 1165, [1978] 3 Comm. Mkt. L.R. at 242.
167 1982 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. at 2932-33, [1982] 1 Comm. Mkt. L.R. at 414-15.
168 Id. at 2927, [1982] 1 Comm. Mkt. L.R. at 421.
1 Id. at 2926, [1982] 1 Comm. Mkt. L.R. at 421.
101 Id. at 2926-27, [1982] 1 Comm. Mkt. L.R. at 421.
101 See supra notes 121-23 and accompanying text.
161 1978 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. at 1166, [1978] 3 Comm. Mkt. L.R. at 243.
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The subjective/objective test issue raised in HLR and AHPC re-
mained unanswered by the European Court. HLR arguably used an objec-
tive test. The European Court looked only to the adverse effects on trade
of the mark holder's exercise of its national trademark rights. In AHPC,
which involved international brand differentiation, the European Court,
in dicta, arguably used subjective criteria in considering the hypothetical
that trademark rights could be used with the intent to partition the
markets.
In Pfizer, Advocate-General Capotorti and the European Commission
argued that AHPC should be limited to its facts as a special case.263
Capotorti's opinion stressed the objective evaluation of artificial parti-
tioning of the markets.""' This position admits, the Advocate-General
conceded, "an implied subjective element since what is under review is
the commercial strategy adopted by a particular manufacturer. [But]
what is not required is identification of intention as the determining fac-
tor."1 " This test would place primary emphasis on the free movement of
goods while accepting the need to afford some protection for trademark
holders.
The European Court has been criticized for not having addressed the
objective/subjective test issue.166 One commentator has raised the issue
whether the Court has stepped beyond its power to interpret Community
law and has attempted to resolve the factual issue itself.1 67 If the Euro-
pean Court has done so, argued the commentator, it would upset a system
"founded on a judicial co-operation and separation between national
courts and the European Court.91 68
One factor in the European Court's decision not to address the sub-
jective/objective test issue in Pfizer may be found in the Oberlandesger-
icht's decision. The appellate court reversed the Landgericht's holding
that AHPC required a showing of subjective intent on the part of the
trademark holder to establish an artificial partitioning of the market.16 9
The appeals court held it sufficient that the measures partitioning the
markets be attributable to the trademark holder and be of an arbitrary
nature.170 Given the European Court's silence on the question, it is sug-
gested that that holding, combined with the Pfizer decision, is sufficient
for the Landgericht "to decide the issues before it.'" 7 The European
163 1982 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. at 2935, [1982] 1 Comm. Mkt. L.R. at 417.
1" See Hendry, supra note 82, at 406-07.
165 Id.
166 Id.
167 Id.
168 Id.
119 1982 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. at 2916, [1982] 1 Comm. Mkt. L.R. at 409.
170 Id. at 2917, [1982] 1 Comm. Mkt. L.R. at 410.
7 The European Court's answer to the Landgericht is, in effect, equivalent for that
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Court's silence, however, leaves open the question for other courts.
IV. PATENTS
A. Centrafarm v. Sterling
In Centrafarm B. V. and de Peijper v. Sterling Drug, Inc.,"7 2 the Eu-
ropean Court first considered the specific subject matter of patents. Ster-
ling Drug held parallel patents in the United Kingdom and the Nether-
lands for the drug marketed under the trade name "Negram."
Centrafarm sought to import lower priced Negram from the United King-
dom, repackage it, and resell it in the Netherlands in competition with
Sterling Drug's Dutch subsidiary. Sterling Drug responded by bringing
suit in Dutch proceedings alleging violation of its Dutch patent. The
Netherlands court sought guidance on the issues of Community law in-
volved and made a referral to the European Court under article 177.
The European Court's decision in Sterling Drug applied the exhaus-
tion of rights principle, holding that article 36 did not permit a patent
holder to restrict the free movement of goods where the products subject
to its patent has previously been marketed in another Member State by
the holder or with its consent. 7 3 The decision provided the first definition
for the specific subject matter of a patent, insofar as Community law de-
fines it for the purpose of permitting exceptions to the free movement of
goods. 74 With regard to the nature of patents, the Court stated:
[T]he specific subject matter of the industrial property is the guarantee
that the patentee, to reward the creative effort of the inventor, has the
exclusive right to use an invention with a view to manufacturing indus-
trial products and putting them into circulation for the first time, either
directly or by the grant of licenses to third parties, as well as the right to
oppose infringements. 175
The thrust of Sterling Drug is to protect the patent holder's right to a
financial reward from the initial sale or licensing of his patented product.
The patent holder could invoke its nationally created patent rights to
prevent the importation of a product subject to such rights, "from a
Member State where it is not patentable and has been manufactured by
court's purposes to the decision of the Oberlandesgericht. One may speculate on the dynam-
ics between the two national courts and the rationale for the Landgericht's referral to the
European Court.
171 1974 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 1147, [1974] 2 Comm. Mkt. L.R. 480. For a factual sum-
mary, see supra note 84 and accompanying text.
17 1974 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. at 1162-63, [1974] 2 Comm. Mkt. L.R. at 503-04.
" See supra note 56 and accompanying text.
175 1974 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. at 1162, [1974] 2 Comm. Mkt. L.R. at 503.
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third parties without the consent of the patentee."'' 7 The patent holder
could not, however, exercise his national rights to limit the free move-
ment of goods "where the product [had] been put onto the market in a
legal manner, by the patentee himself or with his consent, in the Member
State from which it [had] been imported, in particular in the case of a
proprietor of parallel patents."'177
The effect of Sterling Drug was that Sterling Drug was prohibited
from enjoining Centrafarm's importation of Negram from the United
Kingdom to the Netherlands. Focusing on the marketing with consent
doctrine and the guarantee of first marketing, a logical development from
Sterling Drug, from a Community perspective, would be to disregard
whether the goods were patentable in the Member State of first market-
ing.17 8 The effect of this would be to disregard a patent holder's right to a
particular financial reward in order to increase the potential for the free
movement of goods within the entire Community, irrespective of national
variations in patent protection. This is precisely the course adopted by
the Court in its latest patent case, Merck v. Stephar and Exler 7 9
B. Merck v. Stephar and Exler
Merck v. Stephar and Exler 8 0 involved a parallel import situation.
The holder of a Dutch patent for the drug Moduretic (used in the treat-
ment of hypertension) marketed it in the Netherlands and Italy. The
Dutch patent holder sought to prevent a third party from importing into
the Netherlands Moduretic previously marketed by the holder himself in
Italy. At the time of this case, Italian law provided no patent protection
for pharmaceuticals.'" Consequently, drug prices in Italy were substan-
176 Id. at 1162-63, [1974] 2 Comm. Mkt. L.R. at 503 (emphasis added). Cf. 1968 E.
Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 55, 1968 Comm. Mkt. L.R. 47.
17 1974 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. at 1163, [1974] 2 Comm. Mkt. L.R. at 503-04.
178 D. WYATr & A. DASHWOOD, supra note 7, at 353.
171 1981 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 2063, [1981] 3 Comm. Mkt. L.R. 463.
180 See id. at 2065-67, [1981] 3 Comm. Mkt. L.R. at 465 for a factual summary. True
parallel.importation in the case of a patent holder or a licensee exists typically where "a sole
distributor or a subsidiary company-who himself imports the goods[-]seeks to prevent a
third party from importing similar goods deriving from the same producer." Blok, supra
note 37, at 741. In Merck/Stephar, the patent holder or licensee placed the drug into two
national markets within the Community and sought to prevent importation from one mar-
ket to the other by the exercise of his national patent rights in force in the state of
importation.
181 Section 14(1) of the Italian Patent Act (Royal Decree 1127 of June 29, 1939) did not
provide protection for pharmaceuticals at the time of this case. Subsequent to Merck!
Stephar, this section of the Patent Act was held unconstitutional by the Italian Constitu-
tional Court in a judgment on Mar. 20, 1978. Ciba SA v. Uffico Centrale Brevetti, 1979 Eur.
Com. Cases 67. Since this judgment, pharmaceutical patent protection has been available in
Italy. To obtain protection, however, the drug for which a patent is sought must meet the
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tially lower than elsewhere in the Community.
The Dutch patent holder, Merck, joined by France and the United
Kingdom, argued before the European Court that a patent holder ought
to be able to enjoin the reimportation. Otherwise, the patent holder
would be "unable to collect the reward for his creative effort because he
[would] not enjoy a monopoly in first placing the product first on the
market."'18 2 If the reimportation were allowed, it would force the holder to
compete with a lower priced drug which itself had been placed on the
market in the Community. This would destroy the monopoly of the
Dutch patent holder in the Netherlands. Consequently, it followed that
the specific subject matter of patents ought to permit Merck to enjoin the
reimportation of its own product previously marketed elsewhere in the
Community.
Stephar, the importer and the European Commission argued that
once the drug had been marketed by the patent holder anywhere within
the Community, trade in the product so marketed could not be re-
strained, regardless of national variations in the availability of patent
protection.183 In MercklStephar, the patent holder had marketed the
drug of its own choice and must, therefore, accept the financial return
available in the Italian market.18 4
Advocate-General Reischl's opinion agreed with this view. He argued
that Community law must permit a limitation on the free movement of
goods to protect a patent holder's "chance to make a profit" by his first
marketing or licensing of the product within the Community.'8 5 But the
holder operates "in complete freedom of decision ' ' l ss as to his marketing
choice. Community law will not, therefore, "guarantee him any particular
profit.' 87
The European Court agreed with the Advocate-General's opinion.
The European Court's decision elaborated on the specific subject matter
of patents. The Court repeated its concern, expressed earlier in Sterling
Drug, that the patent holder ordinarily obtains his commercial return on
the investment in his product through his first marketing or licensing of
it. 88 The Court added, however, a new qualification to that right based
on reasoning similar to that expressed by the Advocate-General:
novelty requirements. The effect of the judgment, therefore, applies only to new drugs mar-
keted after that date. See 1981 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. at 2065, [1981] 3 Comm. Mkt. L.R. at
465.
12 1981 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. at 2081, [1981] 3 Comm. Mkt. L.R. at 481.
183 Id.
184 Id.
185 Id. at 2091, [1981] 3 Comm. Mkt. L.R. at 474; see Reischl, supra note 41, at 421-22.
1 1981 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. at 2091, [1981] 3 Comm. Mkt. L.R. at 474.
187 Id.
I Id. at 2080, [1981] 3 Comm. Mkt. L.R. at 480.
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That right of first placing a product on the market enables the in-
ventor, by allowing him a monopoly in exploiting his product, to obtain
the reward for his creative effort without, however, guaranteeing that he
will obtain such a reward in all circumstances.
It is for the proprietor of the patent to decide, in the light of all the
circumstances, under what conditions he will market his product, includ-
ing the possibility of marketing it in a Member State where the law does
not provide patent protection for the product in question. If he decides
to do so he must then accept the consequences of his choice as regards
the free movement of the product within the Common Market, which is a
fundamental principle forming part of the legal and economic circum-
stances which must be taken into account by the proprietor of the patent
in determining the manner in which his exclusive right will be
exercised. 9
Merck/Stephar is consistent with the European Court's recent case
law on industrial property in that the characteristics of such property
which Community law will protect are being more narrowly defined in
favor of the free movement of goods.19 Economic analysis should be un-
dertaken to establish that the free movement of goods is, in fact, pro-
moted by these decisions.1 91
After Merck/Stephar, a patent holder has several alternatives. It can
choose to exclude itself from markets where patent protection is unavaila-
ble for its product. This would not promote intra-Community trade and
may isolate the segment of the Community market in which no such pro-
tection exists. Alternatively, the holder could limit the quantity of goods
introduced into states in which no patent protection exists, and, thereby,
limit the price lowering effect of the re-exported goods. A third alterna-
tive is to accept the lower pricing scheme which is inevitable once goods
are placed in the unprotected market and re-exported elsewhere within
the Community. The benefits from this latter choice, for some patent
holders, will be in the increased revenue available from sales in the Com-
munity-wide market. Ultimately, a reasonable solution to this problem
requires a Community-wide legislative response. 92
Merck/Stephar has been critized for being inconsistent with the
Sterling Drug definition of the specific subject matter of patents. Under
MerckStephar, "the patent holder would not have had the advantage of
marketing the product under monopoly conditions, while its importation
189 Id. at 2081-82, [1981] 3 Comm. Mkt. L.R. at 481.
190 See, e.g., Pfizer, 1982 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 2913, [1982] 1 Comm. Mkt. L.R. 406.
For a discussion of this case, see supra notes 140-71 and accompanying text.
191 See Fuller, supra note 135; P. DEMAREr, PATENTs, TERRITORIAL REsTRICIONS AND
EEC LAW (1978).
191 For a discussion of the early stages of Community legislation in this area, see P.
DEMARET, supra note 191; see also supra notes 61-64 and accompanying text.
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at a lower price would tend to undermine the value of the patentee's ex-
clusive right in the State where protection was available." 193
Advocate-General Reischl emphatically supported the European
Court's rationale in MercklStephar in a recent article.19' The Advocate-
General noted that a patent holder is free to market goods made under its
patent in any or all Member States. But once the product has been mar-
keted in any Member State, either by the holder or with his consent, "the
product can then be dealt with throughout the whole Common Market
and it is irrelevent whether the proprietor of the patent had or did not
have the possibility of obtaining a patent in the particular Member
State. 1 9 5 The proprietor has, in effect, elected his financial returns by its
choice of Member State in which to first release the product. If the prod-
uct commands a lower price in that Member State, because there is no
patent protection available, the proprietor cannot subsequently limit
trade in that product to isolate other segments of the Community market
in order to obtain a higher product price.
In Merck/Stephar, the European Court has carried the consent doc-
trine, with regard to patents, to its logical conclusion in support of the
free movement of goods. A similar development is beginning in the
emerging area of copyrights."'
V. COPYRIGHT AND RELATED RIGHTS
A. Early Case Law
The specific subject matter of copyright and related rights, such as
theatrical performance rights, is the most difficult to define, as the cases
discussed in this section demonstrate. The difficulty is that these rights
include a tremendous variety of activities and diverse forms of rights of
use. Each right is protected under different national rules "for which it
would not be possible to define the specific subject matter ... in general
terms. ' 19 7 The cases discussed in this section have begun the process of
defining the concept of particular rights. Defining the specific subject
matter of the variety of these rights must await further decisions.
The early case of Deutsche Grammophon Gesellschaft v. Metro-S.B.-
Grossmarkte s19 introduced the relationship between copyrights and the
193 D. WYATT & A. DASHWOOD, supra note 7, at 353. Professor Dashwood's quote antici-
pated a Merck/Stephar type decision prior to the Court's actual judgment in that case.
I' Reischl, supra note 41.
195 Id. at 421.
" See GEMA, 1981 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 147, [1981] 2 Comm. Mkt. L.R. 44. For a
discussion of this case, see infra notes 235-53 and accompanying text.
97 Reischl, supra note 41, at 425.
198 1971 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 487, 1971 Comm. Mkt. L.R. 631.
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EEC Treaty articles on the free movement of goods and the freedom to
provide services. Deutsche Grammophon was the first case to consider
the legality under Community law of the exercise of an industrial prop-
erty right solely under articles 30 and 36.199 The European Court articu-
lated its distinction between the existence of industrial property rights
which is determined by state law, and the exercise of those rights which is
subject to restrictions imposed by Community law.200 The European
Court introduced the now fundamental concept of the specific subject
matter of industrial property in this importafit case.20 1
Deutsche Grammophon involved the exclusive right to the distribu-
tion of sound recordings (a right similar to copyright) under German
law. 20 2 Deutsche Grammophon (DG) produced and distributed records
within the Community. DG's subsidiary, Polydor Records, sold DG
records in the Paris market. Metro at one time had marketed records for
DG in Germany, but DG had terminated its relationship. Subsequent
thereto, Metro purchased a quantity of DG's records from DG's subsidi-
ary in Paris, Polydor, through an unrelated third party. Metro then sold
the records in Germany, undercutting DG's established retail price
structure.
DG instituted proceedings in a German court to enjoin Metro from
selling in the German market, alleging that Metro was violating DG's ex-
clusive distribution rights. DG argued in the German proceedings that its
exclusive distribution right could be exhausted under German law only
when DG had placed the records in the German market. DG argued that
it was entitled, therefore, to prohibit Metro's importation and sale of
records that had originally been marketed by DG through its Paris
subsidiary.
On a reference from the German court, the European Court held as
follows:
[I]t would be in conflict with the provisions prescribing the free move-
ment of products within the common market for a manufacturer of
sound recordings to exercise the exclusive right to distribute the pro-
tected articles, conferred upon him by the legislation of a Member State,
in such a way as to prohibit the sale in that State of products placed on
the market by him or with his consent in another Member State solely
because such distribution did not occur within the territory of the first
Member State. 03
The Court articulated the distinction between the existence and ex-
'9 Id. at 499-500, 1971 Comm. Mkt. L.R. at 657.
200 Id.
201 Id.
2 See id. at 489-90, 1971 Comm. Mkt. L.R. at 633-34 for a factual summary.
202 Id. at 500, 1971 Comm. Mkt. L.R. at 657-58.
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ercise of industrial property rights and suggested that only the latter was
subject to limitations created by Community law.204 Limitations on the
free movement of goods, permitted by article 36, would be allowed only to
protect the rights associated with the specific subject matter of a particu-
lar industrial property right. The specific subject matter of an initial dis-
tribution right was exhausted when the holder placed its goods on the
market in any Member State. 05 As a result, DG could not prohibit Metro
from selling records in Germany, which had originally been marketed by
DG in France. Had the European Court held otherwise, it would have
permitted the segregation of the French and German markets which
would have been inconsistent with article 30.
The European Court interpreted article 36 in this manner only "[o]n
the assumption that those provisions may be relevant to a right related to
copyright ' 20 6 without expressly deciding the point. The European Court
has addressed copyright and related rights more directly in subsequent
cases.
B. Recent Case Law Developments
The next four cases are among the European Court's most recent de-
cisions on the relationship between industrial property rights and Com-
munity law. All deal with copyright or related rights and two deal directly
with articles 30 and 36. In one of the four, the Court expressly included
copyright within the definition of article 36's phrase "industrial and com-
mercial property right" for the first time.20 7 The cases collectively illus-
trate the variety of rights that fall within the general category of "copy-
right and related rights." They also illustrate the difficulty of identifying
the specific subject matter of these varied rights.
These cases will be dealt with chronologically in order to highlight
the incremental development of Community law in this area. Coditel v.
Cine Vog Films2 8 (Coditel 1) examines the distinction between broad-
casting rights and the distribution of goods aspects of copyright (dealt
with in Deutsche Grammophon). Musik-Vertrib Membran and K-Tel
Int'l v. GEMA 0 9 involves trade in copyrighted sound recordings. It
presents the issue of whether the copyright protection society, charged
with collectively representing the rights of copyright holders, in one
20" Id. at 499-500, 1971 Comm. Mkt. L.R. at 657.
205 Id. at 502, 1971 Comm. Mkt. L.R. at 659.
200 Id. at 499-500, 1971 Comm. Mkt. L.R. at 657.
207 See infra notes 242-44 and accompanying text.
208 1980 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 881, [1981] 2 Comm. Mkt. L.R. 362; see Harris, Commu-
nity Law and Intellectual Property: Recent Cases in the Court of Justice, 19 COMMON
MKT. L. REV. 61 (1982).
209 1981 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 174, [1981] 2 Comm. Mkt. L.R. 44.
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Member State can enforce the prevailing royalty rate on records imported
from another Member State where the records were originally subject to a
lower rate.
The third case is Dansk Supermarked v. Imerco.21 0 Imerco repre-
sents an important extension of the European Court's jurisprudence be-
cause it analyzes the status of copyright holders and trademark owners,
with regard to the exhaustion of rights principle, in language similar to
those employed in patent and trademark cases. The fourth case is Coditel
v. Cine Vog Films2 1' (Coditel II). Coditel II elaborates on the principles
established in Coditel I regarding the application of the principles relat-
ing to industrial property to the freedom to provide services.
All four cases illustrate the Court's assimilation of "the various
branches of intellectual property" as applied to fundamental treaty provi-
sions respecting the free movement of goods and provisions of services.2 12
The variety of property rights involved and the difficulty in determining
the specific subject matter of each underscores the difficulty and incom-
pleteness in resolving the conflicting interests of national and Community
decisional law. These cases emphasize the need for a Community-wide
legislative response in this area.
1. Coditel v. Cine Vog Films
Coditel I involved assignments to copyright in a film and the rela-
tionship of the assignment to the Community rules on the freedom to
provide services.2' s Films la Boetie is a French firm that owned the rights
to the film "Le Boucher." By an agreement of July 8, 1969, la Boetie
granted the exclusive rights to show "Le Boucher" in Belgium for seven
years to a Belgian film distribution company, Cine Vog Films S.A. There
was to be no showing of the film on Belgian television for forty months.
Belgian theatres began showing "Le Boucher" May 15, 1970. In a sepa-
rate agreement with the German television authorities, Films la Boetie
granted German television the right to broadcast a German version of
"Le Boucher" subtitled "Der Schlachter." German television broadcast
the film on January 5, 1971.
Three Belgian cable television companies, known collectively as the
Coditel companies, provided cable television service for part of Belgium.
Coditel recorded the German broadcast on January 5 and rebroadcast it
over its cable system to Belgian viewers. Cine Vog, the Belgian owner of
210 1981 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 181, [1981] 3 Comm. Mkt. L.R. 590.
21 1982 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 3381, [1983] 1 Comm. Mkt. L.R. 49.
212 Harris, supra note 208, at 76.
" See 1980 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. at 883-84, 899-901, [1981] 2 Comm. Mkt. L.R. at 367-
70, 391-93 for a factual summary.
Vol. 16:381
INDUSTRIAL PROPERTY RIGHTS
the rights to "Der Schlachter" objected on the grounds that the rebroad-
cast jeopardized the commercial future of the theatre showings in
Belgium.
Cine Vog, consequently, initiated Belgian proceedings against Films
la Boetie for breach of its exclusive showing agreement. Cine Vog also
proceeded against Coditel for its rebroadcast of the film by cable on the
grounds that this breached Cine Vog's exclusive showing rights under
Belgian copyright law.
The trial court held for Cine Vog21 4 In appellate proceedings, the
Cour d'Appel, Brussels, held that "the authorization given by the copy-
right owner to German television to broadcast the film did not include
authority to relay the film over cable ... at least... in Belgium. 211
In its defense, Coditel had argued that the exhaustion of rights doc-
trine, established by the European Court in trademark and patent cases,
applied by analogy to the freedom to provide services. Coditel reasoned
that since the provision of film broadcasts for remuneration is a service, 21 6
Cine Vog would be prohibited from restricting that freedom by the exer-
cise of its copyright.1 7
The Cour d'Appel referred two questions to the European Court to
aid in its resolution of the issue:
1. Are the restrictions prohibited by Article 59 of the Treaty estab-
lishing the European Economic Community only those which prejudice
the provision of services between nationals established in different Mem-
ber States, or do they also comprise restrictions on the provision of ser-
vices between nationals established in the same Member State which
however concern services the substance of which originates in another
Member State?
2. If the first limb of the preceding question is answered in the af-
firmative, is it in accordance with the provisions of the Treaty on free-
dom to provide services for the assignee of the performing right in a
cinematographic film in one Member State to rely upon his right in order
to prevent the defendant from showing that film in that State by means
of cable television where the film thus shown is picked up by the defen-
dant in the said Member State after having been broadcast by a third
party in another Member State with the consent of the original owner of
the right?1 8
The European Court first responded to the second question, because
a negative answer to that question would obviate the need to reply to the
214 Id. at 884, [1981] 2 Comm. Mkt. L.R. at 369.
215 Id. at 900, [1981] 2 Comm. Mkt. L.R. at 392.
216 Id. at 902-03, [1981] 2 Comm. Mkt. L.R. at 393-94 (construing article 60). Articles
59-66 deal with the freedom to provide services. See Harris, supra note 208, at 64.
217 1980 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. at 890-91.
218 Id. at 901-02, [1981] 2 Comm. Mkt. L.R. at 398-99.
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first question. The second question raised the issue of whether articles 59
and 60, which establish the freedom to provide services within the Com-
munity, prohibited assignments of copyright in a film when such assign-
ments were restricted to the territory of a single Member State. The po-
tential for harm to Community trade is that such an assignment could
lead to partitioning segments of the Community market in the film
industry.
Three general positions were argued before the European Court by
Coditel, the Federal Republic of Germany and the European Commission
respectively.219 Coditel, relying on the same theory that it presented to
the Cour d'Appel, argued that the exhaustion of rights doctrine applied to
the freedom to provide services by analogy with the free movement of
goods cases. 22 0 Hence, once the copyright holder had licensed the per-
formance of its work anywhere in the Community, it could not prohibit
the rebroadcast of that work anywhere within the Community. Coditel
also argued that the common origin doctrine applied in that Cine Vog
could not use its performance rights to restrict the provision of services
by Coditel because Cine Vog's rights had a common origin with those of
German television,2 2 1 since both derived their rights from la Boetie.
The argument advanced by the Federal Republic of Germany was to
deny that the exhaustion of rights doctrine applied to copyright.222 They
argued that copyright was a fundamentally different right from other in-
tellectual property rights. It comprised "a lasting right of prohibition
which derives from its function in terms of property, remuneration and
reputation which is not exhausted when the right is exploited.' '223
The European Commission accepted that a copyright could be sub-
sumed in the term industrial property (as used in article 36), but argued
that performance rights were distinguishable from rights in material me-
dia such as books and records.224 Performance rights are distinguishable
"by the fact that they are not exhausted at the first performance of the
works they protect .... [Elach performance gives rise to copyright and,
therefore, remuneration, '2 5 whereas only the first sale of a copy of a book
is subject to copyright restrictions.
The European Court agreed with the Commission. Performance
rights were distinct from other forms of copyright such as in material
media:
'I Id. at 884-98; see Harris, supra note 208, at 65-67 for a summary of these positions.
220 1980 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. at 890-91.
221 See Hag, 1974 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 731, [1974] 2 Comm. Mkt. L.R. 127. For a
discussion of this case, see supra notes 73-82 and accompanying text.
222 1980 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. at 887-89.
23 Harris, supra note 208, at 66.
224 1980 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. at 893-94.
22 Id. at 894.
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A cinematographic film belongs to the category of literary and artistic
works made available to the public by performances which may be infi-
nitely repeated. In this respect the problems involved in the observance
of copyright in relation to the requirements of the [EEC] Treaty are not
the same as those which arise in connexion with literary and artistic
works the placing of which at the disposal of the public is inseparable
from the circulation of the material form of the works, as in the case of
books or records.226
Following on this characterization, the European Court noted that
the copyright owner had a legitimate interest in receiving fees based upon
the number of performances. 2 27 The right of the copyright owner and his
assigns "to require fees for any showing of a film is part of the essential
function of copyright in this type of literary and artistic work.1228
The European Court stated that although article 59 prohibited re-
strictions on the freedom to provide services, it did not "encompass limits
upon the exercise of certain economic activities which have their origin in
the application of national legislation for the protection of intellectual
property," except where it would constitute a means of arbitrary discrimi-
nation or a disguised restriction on trade between Member States.229
The Court thus held that the principles of article 36 applied by anal-
ogy to the freedom to provide services as the European Commission had
contended. Article 36 expressed a general principle not confined to the
free movement of goods, it argued, and this principle "must also apply to
the freedom to provide services to the extent to which literary and artistic
property rights may give rise to the provision of services. 2 30
One question remained, however: whether an assignment of a copy-
right limited to the territory of a Member State constituted a restriction
on the freedom to provide services. The European Court noted that the
copyright owner and his assigns had a legitimate interest in collecting fees
for each performance of this type of artistic work.23 1 In addition, televi-
sion is organized in the Member States largely on the basis of legal mo-
nopolies restricted to the territorial limits of each state. As a conse-
quence, any "limitation other than the geographical field of application of
an assignment is often impracticable. '232 The Court held, therefore, that
Community law did not prohibit a copyright owner in films or its assignee
from enforcing geographical limitations in the licensing of the protected
226 Id. at 902, [1981] 2 Comm. Mkt. L.R. at 399.
227 Id. at 902-03, [1981] 2 Comm. Mkt. L.R. at 399.
228 Id. at 903, [1981] 2 Comm. Mkt. L.R. at 399-400.
229 Id. at 903, [1981] 2 Comm. Mkt. L.R. at 400.
220 Id. at 894.
231 Id. at 902, [1981] 2 Comm. Mkt. L.R. at 399.
232 Id. at 903-04, [1981] 2 Comm. Mkt. L.R. at 400.
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works.23 3 As a practical matter, this was the only means by which the
owner or his assignee could protect the essential function of their rights
which was the right to collect fees on a performance basis.
The European Court responded to the questions put by the Cour
d'Appel in Coditel I by stating that Community law did not preclude the
owner of a copyright in a film, or his assigns, from prohibiting the unau-
thorized broadcast of the film by cable television companies which had
picked up the transmission broadcasts of an assignee of the owner in an-
other Member State.2 3 As a consequence, Community law did not affect
national copyright legislation in this case. The European Court, therefore,
had no need to respond to the Cour d'Appel's first question.
2. Musik-Vertrieb Membran and K-Tel Int'l v. GEMA
GEMA23 5 involved two cases brought by the German Copyright Pro-
tection Society, GEMA (the German acronym), against firms importing
records and sound recordings into the Federal Republic of Germany.23 6 In
the first case, Musik-Vertrieb imported phonograph records and cassettes
from various countries including other Member States. In the second
case, K-Tel International imported a supply of records from the United
Kingdom. In both cases, the recordings contained works protected under
German copyright laws.
Due to international agreements and industry practice, the royalty
rate in continental Europe, including the Federal Republic of Germany,
was 8 percent.23 7 The prevailing rate in the United Kingdom, however,
was 6.25 percent.2 3 8 The royalty paid on the recordings imported into
Germany was calculated upon the rate prevailing in the country where
they were manufactured and first marketed. Since this was below the 8
percent due on the German market, GEMA sought to charge the importer
the difference between the German rate and the amount paid on the
records in the country of manufacture.
GEMA brought proceedings in German courts on the basis that the
importation of the records without the payment of the prevailing German
233 Id. at 904, [1981] 2 Comm. Mkt. L.R. at 400-01.
234 Id. at 905, [1981] 2 Comm. Mkt. L.R. at 401.
"1 1981 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 147, [1981] 2 Comm. Mkt. L.R. 44.
236 See id. at 159-66, [1981] 2 Comm. Mkt. L.R. at 47-49 for a factual summary.
237 Id. at 168, [1981] 2 Comm. Mkt. L.R. at 50.
23" Id. at 164-65, [1981] 2 Comm. Mkt. L.R. at 50. This was due to the application of
section 8 of the Copyright Act of 1956. In effect, section 8 established a maximum royalty of
6.25 percent because it permitted any manufacturer to reproduce records lawfully placed on
the United Kingdom market by the copyright holder upon the payment of a fixed royalty of
6.25 percent. As a consequence, no manufacturer would offer a copyright holder more than
the statutory 6.25 percent. Id.
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royalty rate violated German copyright law. The German courts agreed,
holding that GEMA was entitled to the prevailing German rate less
amounts paid in the country of manufacture. 23 9 In appellate proceedings,
the German Federal Supreme Court (the Bundesgerichtshof), questioned
the compatibility of these provisions of German law with articles 30 and
36 of the EEC Treaty. The Bundesgerichtshof referred the following
question to the European Court:
Is it compatible with the provisions of the EEC Treaty concerning the
free movement of goods (Articles 30 et seq.) that a collecting society em-
powered to exercise authors copyrights-should make use of the exclu-
sive right of the author in Member State A, to fix his musical works on a
material support, to reproduce and distribute them, when it claims the
following: in respect of the marketing in Member State A of sound carri-
ers which have been manufactured and put into circulation in Member
State B and in return for payment of a license royalty based on the num-
ber of copies and the retail price in the Member State-payment of an
amount corresponding to the license royalty usually received in Member
State A for manufacture and marketing after deduction, however of the
(lower) royalty paid in Member State B for the manufacture and market-
ing of the said sound carriers. 240
This question illustrates the conflict between nationally created
rights in industrial property and fundamental principles of Community
law. The copyright owner would prefer that copyrighted goods sold in a
Member State pay the prevailing (hopefully higher) rate in that state.
This is to the owner's financial benefit, even if it must charge an addi-
tional fee on imported goods, already marketed in another Member State,
because the lower fee is permitted only in the first state. From a Commu-
nity perspective, the concern is that the levying of an additional fee on
imported goods, already lawfully marketed by the owner in another Mem-
ber State, will act as a barrier to trade. The Bundesgerichtshof's question
asked whether this additional fee could be charged, as provided for by
German copyright law, or did state law which permitted the fee to be
levied violate articles 30 and 36.
The response of the European Court first emphasized that sound re-
cordings are products to which the system of free movement of goods
under articles 30 and 36 applied.2 1 National legislation which obstructed
trade in sound recordings constituted a measure equivalent to a quantita-
tive restriction under article 30. This was true even when national legisla-
tion permitted a copyright protection society to restrict intra-Community
"I Id. at 150, [1981] 2 Comm. Mkt. L.R. at 47-48.
240 Id. at 151, [1981] 2 Comm. Mkt. L.R. at 49.
241 Id. at 161, [1981] 2 Comm. Mkt. L.R. at 63. This paragraph summarizes considera-
tion 8 of the Court's judgment.
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trade in sound recordings based on the protection society's exclusive right
of exploitation on behalf of the copyright holders.
The European Court acknowledged that article 36 created an excep-
tion to the free movement of goods for the protection of industrial and
commercial property. The European Court expressly stated that this
phrase included copyrights, "especially when exploited commercially in
the form of licenses capable of affecting distribution in the various Mem-
ber States of goods incorporating the protected literary or artistic
work. 24 2 In fact, the parties in GEMA had unanimously agreed that cop-
yright was within the protection of article 36.243 The European Court re-
stated the general proposition that an owner of industrial property could
not prohibit the importation into one Member State of goods already law-
fully marketed in another Member State.244
The French government in argument before the European Court, has
strongly opposed the application of the exhaustion principle to copy-
righted goods because, it argued, that right was not comparable to other
industrial property rights.245 It argued that copyrights included moral
rights such as the right to claim authorship and the right to prohibit dis-
tortions or alterations of the work, together with other similar rights re-
lating to the author's reputation and the status of the work. The Euro-
pean Court agreed with the French government's position that copyrights
included such moral rights, but it included other economic rights as
well,2"4 such as the right to control the commercial exploitation and mar-
keting of the protected works.247 From an economic perspective, however,
the European Court held that the "commercial exploitation of copyright
[raised] the same issues as that of any other industrial or commercial
property right. 24 8
The European Court concluded that it would be incompatible with
Community law for national legislation to permit a copyright protection
society in one Member State to levy a royalty fee on imported goods al-
ready lawfully marketed by the copyright holder in another Member
State.249 Such a charge would be levied merely because the protected
work had crossed an internal Community 'frontier. It would, therefore,
have the effect of "entrenching the isolation of national markets which
242 Id. at 161, [1981] 2 Comm. Mkt. L.R. at 64.
234 Id. at 176, [1981] 2 Comm. Mkt. L.R. at 58.
244 Id. at 161, [1981] 2 Comm. Mkt. L.R. at 64.
245 Cf. Coditel (No.1), 1980 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 881, [1981] 2 Comm. Mkt. L.R. 362
(argument by the German government discussed supra notes 222-23 and accompanying
text).
246 1981 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. at 162, [1981] 2 Comm. Mkt. L.R. at 64.
47 Id.
248 Id.
249 Id. at 164-65, [1981] 2 Comm. Mkt. L.R. at 65-66.
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the Treaty seeks to abolish."25
The European Court held that the fact that national legislation
within the Community permitted different royalty rates in different coun-
tries was no defense; such disparity could "not be used to impede the free
movement of goods in the Common Market."251 The European Court
foreshadowed its remarks in MercklStephar,25 2 decided subsequently, by
stating that the copyright holder was free to market its goods within the
Community as market conditions and varying national laws dictated. In
exchange, however, for the enhanced marketing facilities of the Common
Market, the copyright holder would not be permitted to isolate national
markets within the Community.253
The European Court's decision had the effect of prohibiting GEMA
from charging additional royalty fees on records imported into Germany
from another Member State where they had been first marketed by the
copyright holder. The European Court held that the holder's release of its
protected goods in one Member State exhausted its ability to restrict
trade in those goods throughout the Community.
3. Dansk Supermarked v. Imerco
The European Court's decision in Imerco2" involved a combination
of two basic issues: (1) trade in copyrighted or trademarked products (ad-
dressed in GEMA); and, (2) the relationship between national laws on
unfair trade practices and the principles of article 36 EEC (addressed in
Terrapin).
A/S Imerco was a Danish organization established to purchase hard-
ware goods for its shareholders on a wholesale basis. 255 Its shareholders
were Danish retailers who marketed their goods throughout Denmark.
Imerco commissioned Broadhurst, a British manufacturer, to produce a
special china service to commemorate Imerco's fiftieth anniversary. The
service contained Imerco's trademarked logo as well as pictures of various
Danish castles in which Imerco held the relevant copyrights under Danish
law.
Imerco imposed stringent quality control standards on the produc-
tion of the commemorative china services. Consequently, it rejected sev-
eral hundred china services as substandard. Imerco marketed the high
250 Id.
251 Id. at 165, [1981] 2 Comm. Mkt. L.R. at 67.
252 1981 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 2063, [1981] 3 Comm. Mkt. L.R. 463. For the discussion
of the case, see supra notes 180-96 and accompanying text.
:53 1981 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. at 165, [1981] 2 Comm. Mkt. L.R. at 67.
2" 1981 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 181, [1981] 3 Comm. Mkt. L.R. 590.
255 See id. at 191, 197, [1981] 3 Comm. Mkt. L.R. at 591-93, 599-600 for a factual
summary.
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quality services exclusively through its shareholders and permitted
Broadhurst, the manufacturer, to sell the rejected services in the United
Kingdom and elsewhere. Imerco required, however, that Broadhurst cove-
nant on the condition not to market the china services in Denmark or any
other Scandinavian country.
Dansk Supermarked A/S, a Danish retailer unconnected with Imerco,
acquired several hundred of the substandard china services from
Broadhurst through third parties. Dansk then marketed the substandard
services in Denmark, in direct competition with Imerco. Dansk sold the
substandard services at substantially lower prices than those services sold
by Imerco, without indicating the difference in quality, thereby violating
Danish laws on unfair competition.
Following Dansk's rejection of Imerco's suggestion that it cease this
practice, Imerco obtained an injunction against Dansk's marketing of the
substandard services in Denmark. In the Danish proceedings Imerco con-
tended, inter alia, that Dansk had also violated the relevant trademarks
and copyrights which it held in the china services.
The Danish trial court's judgment was affirmed on appeal and Dansk
then sought a second appeal from the Danish Supreme Court. The latter
referred the question of Community law to the European Court. The re-
ferral called for an interpretation of article 30, on the elimination of
quantative restrictions on imports and measures having equivalent effect,
and article 36 which provides an exception to article 30 for the protection
of industrial and commercial property.
The European Court interpreted the Danish referral as asking the
following:
[W]hether goods which have been lawfully marketed in one Member
State with the consent of the undertaking which is entitled to sell them
may be prohibited, under an agreement concluded between that under-
taking and the manufacturer, from being marketed in another Member
State either on the basis of national provisions on the protection of copy-
right or trade marks or under legislation on marketing." 6
The question raised two issues: (1) whether Imerco could assert its
copyright or trademark rights to enjoin Dansk from marketing the sub-
standard services; and (2) whether Imerco could assert provisions of Dan-
ish unfair competition law to prohibit Dansk from trading in goods that
Imerco had already permitted to be marketed in another Member State.
The European Court decision first restated its well established inter-
pretations of articles 30 and 36, citing Terrapin for support. 57 The
-56 Id. at 192, [1981] 3 Comm. Mkt. L.R. at 601.
257 Id. at 193, [1981] 3 Comm. Mkt. L.R. at 601-02, citing Terrapin, 1976 E. Comm. Ct.
J. Rep. 1038, [1976] 2 Comm. Mkt. L.R. 482.
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Treaty did not affect the existence of industrial property rights but, de-
pending on the circumstances, could limit the exercise of those rights.
Article 36 permitted exceptions to the free movement of goods only to
protect the specific subject matter of the particular industrial property
rights. A proprietor's exclusive rights in its industrial and commercial
property were "exhausted when a product [had] been lawfully distributed
on the market in another Member State by the actual proprietor of the
right or with his consent."25
Applying these well established principles, the European Court re-
sponded to the first issue raised by the Danish Supreme Court's question
as follows:
[T]he judicial authorities of a Member State may not prohibit, on the
basis of a copyright or of a trade mark, the marketing on the territory of
that State of a product to which one of those rights applies if that prod-
uct has been lawfully marketed on the territory of another Member State
by the proprietor of such rights or with his consent.25"
The European Court's analysis at this point was a straight- forward
application of its prior case law. The decision is particularly noteworthy,
however, for the court's language in interpreting article 36. The Court
expressly treated copyright on the same basis as trademark rights for the
first time.260
The second issue facing the Danish Supreme Court was whether na-
tional legislation on unfair marketing practices may be asserted to justify
an exception to the free movement of goods. The European Court estab-
lished the basis for its response to the second issue in its discussion of the
Danish law on unfair competition. "[T]hat law is comparable in certain
respects to the legislation in force in other Member States against unfair
competition, but it has in addition other objectives in that sphere, in par-
ticular the protection of consumers." 2 1
The European Court then stated that Community law did not pro-
hibit applying national legislation to unfair competition. Such legislation
may restrict trade in goods if the marketing of those goods is considered
to be improper or unfair.6 2 The mere fact that the goods are imported,
however, is not sufficient to constitute an unfair trade practice. 26 The
conditions constituting an unfair trade practice must be "distinct from
258 1981 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. at 193, [1981] 3 Comm. Mkt. L.R. at 601-02.
259 Id. at 194, [19811 3 Comm. Mkt. L.R. at 602.
260 Id.
281 Id. at 194, [1981] 3 Comm. Mkt. L.R. at 602. For a description of Danish Law No.
297 of June 14, 1974, see id. at 184, [1981] 3 Comm. Mkt. L.R. at 592.
262 Id. at 194, [1981] 3 Comm. Mkt. L.R. at 602.
283 Id.
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the importation itself." '264 Private agreements between individuals, as be-
tween Imerco and Broadhurst, could not alter the mandatory provisions
of Community law. The Court held, therefore, that a private agreement
requiring that goods not be imported into a Member State may not be
used to characterize a sale of goods as an unfair trade practice.265 Imerco,
therefore, could not use its agreement with Broadhurst as the basis for
characterizing Dansk's sale of the substandard services as an unfair trade
practice under Danish law. Some other condition of Dansk's sale of the
service, such as its failure to note that they were seconds or substandard,
would have to be relied upon to make such a characterization.266
In summary, the European Court interpreted article 30 for the Dan-
ish Supreme Court as follows:
That the importation into a Member State of goods lawfully marketed in
another Member State could not as such be classified as an improper or
unfair commercial practice, without prejudice however to the possible
application of legislation of the State of importation against such prac-
tices on the ground of the circumstances or methods of offering such
goods for sale as distinct from the actual fact of importation; and that an
agreement between individuals intended to prohibit the importation of
such goods could not be relied upon or taken into consideration in order
to classify the marketing of such goods as an improper or unfair commer-
cial practice.26 7
Imerco is noteworthy for the European Court's placement of copy-
rights on the same basis as trademark rights in its interpretation of arti-
cle 36. Commentary on Imerco had centered on the Court's failure to
place national legislation on unfair competition on the same basis as the
Court's view of industrial property so as to justify an exception to article
30.268 "Both in international law and in general content, there is if any-
thing an even closer relationship between trade mark rights and rights
arising from the repression of unfair competition than between trade
mark rights and copyright.
269
Advocate-General Capotorti, in his opinion in Imerco, had argued
that the reasoning applied to industrial property rights equally applied to
national laws regulating unfair competition.2 7 0 The Advocate-General had
conceded that such provisions were not expressly included in article 36 as
26 Id. at 195, [1981] 3 Comm. Mkt. L.R. at 602-03.
266 Id. at 195, [1981] 3 Comm. Mkt. L.R. at 603.
266 Id.
267 Id.
268 Harris, supra note 208, at 76.
" Id.
270 1981 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. at 200-02, [1981] 3 Comm. Mkt. L.R. at 596-97.
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an exception to the free movement of goods.271 But the Advocate-General
argued that the European Court's prior case law interpreting article 30
supported the following proposition: in the absence of Community rules
on fair marketing standards, it was necessary to accept obstacles to the
free movement of goods resulting from national laws "which apply with-
out discrimination to both domestic and imported products ... in order
to satisfy imperative requirements relating in particular to . . . the fair-
ness of commercial transactions and the defence of the consumer."27 2 The
Advocate-General concluded that the European Court had, therefore, ex-
tended the scope of lawful restrictions on the free movement of goods
beyond article 36.273 These restrictions were permitted, provided that
they "serve a purpose which is in the general interest and such as to take
precedence over the requirements of the free movement of goods, which
constitutes one of the fundamental rules of the Community. '274 The Eu-
ropean Court had an opportunity to expand on its interpretation of arti-
cle 36 and the freedom to provide services in a second case involving
Coditel and Cine Vog Films.
271 Id. at 200, [1981] 3 Comm. Mkt. L.R. at 596.
272 Id.
273 1981 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. at 200, [1981] 3 Comm. Mkt. L.R. at 596.
274 Id., citing REWE, 1979 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 649, 664, [1979] 3 Comm. Mkt. L.R.
494, 510. The European Court has recently addressed this question in Industrie Diensten
Groep B.V. v. J.A. Beele Handelmaatschappij B.V., 1982 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 707, [1982] 3
Comm. Mkt. L.R. 102. In Beele, a Swedish firm had been importing goods into Member
States of the Community including the Netherlands and Germany since 1963. After the
expiration of the patent covering these products, a West German firm started manufactur-
ing the identical product and exporting it to the Netherlands. The Dutch importer of the
Swedish product sought to enjoin this conduct arguing that, under Dutch marketing law, the
German products were confusingly similar to the Swedish goods. The Dutch Court granted
the injunction. Although the goods had been lawfully marketed in Germany, Dutch law re-
garded the products as confusingly similar and, therefore, their importation into the Nether-
lands was considered an unfair trade practice. The Dutch appellate court questioned the
compatibility of this judicially created rule of unfair competition with articles 30 and 36,
and referred the question to the European Court. The European Court held:
[I]n the absence of common rules relating to the production and marketing of
products, obstacles to movement within the Community resulting from disparities
between national legislation must be accepted in so far as such legislation, apply-
ing without discrimination to both domestic and imported products, may be justi-
fied as being necessary in order to satisfy mandatory requirements relating in par-
ticular to the protection of consumers and fairness in commercial transactions.
Id. at 716, [1982] 3 Comm. Mkt. L.R. at 127. The Court cited Cassis de Dijon, 1979 E.
Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 649, [1979] 3 Comm. Mkt. L.R. 494, and Commission v. Ireland, 1981 E.
Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 1625, [1982] 1 Comm. Mkt. L.R. 706, for support. The position regarding
the equation of national rules on unfair trade practices to the industrial property exceptions
of article 36 appears not to have changed. See Beele, 1982 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. at 711,
[1982] 3 Comm. Mkt. L.R. at 120, for the Court's rationale.
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4. Coditel v. Cine Vog Films
Coditel 11275 elaborated on the European Court's application of the
principles relating to industrial property to the freedom to provide ser-
vices, discussed initially in Coditel L276 Coditel II was a second referral
from Belgium courts in the same national proceedings involved in Coditel
I. A review of the procedural history will place the second case in
perspective. 2
7
By a judgment of March 30, 1979, the Belgian Cour d'Appel, or civil
appellate court, in a case brought by a Belgian film distribution company
known as Cine Vog, stayed the proceedings against cable television com-
panies collectively known as Coditel. The Cour d'Appel referred two
questions on the interpretation of articles 59 and 60 (on the freedom to
provide services) to the European Court. The European Court replied to
those questions in its judgment on March 18, 1980, in Coditel L By its
judgment of March 30, 1979, however, the Cour d'Appel had held that
article 85, which prohibits agreements or concerted practices restraining
intra-Community trade, had no application to the facts of the case.2 78
Coditel appealed the Cour d'Appel's decision of March 30, 1979, to the
Belgian Cour de Cassation, the supreme administrative court. In a judg-
ment of September 3, 1981, which was after the European Court's deci-
sion in Coditel I, the Cour de Cassation referred the interpretation of
articles 85 and 36 in this case to the European Court. The European
Court's reply to this referral by the Cour de Cassation is the subject of
Coditel II.
The Belgian Cour de Cassation had asked the European Court the
following question:
Where a company which is the proprietor of the rights of exploitation of
a cinematographic film grants by contract to a company in another Mem-
ber State an exclusive right to show that film in that State, for a speci-
fied period, is that contract liable, by reason of the rights and obligations
contained in it and of the economic and legal circumstances surrounding
it, to constitute an agreement, decision or concerted practice which is
prohibited between undertakings pursuant to Article 85 (1) and (2) of
the Treaty or are those provisions inapplicable either because the right
to show the film is part of the specific subject-matter of copyright and
accordingly Article 36 of the Treaty would be an obstacle to the applica-
tion of Article 85, or because the right relied on by the assignee of the
right to show the film derives from a legal status which confers on the
275 1982 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 3381, [1983] 1 Comm. Mkt. L.R. 49.
217 1980 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 881, [1981] 2 Comm. Mkt. L.R. 362.
277 See 1982 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. at 3383-84, [1983] 1 Comm. Mkt. L.R. at 51-53 for a
factual summary.
278 Id. at 3384, [1983] 1 Comm. Mkt. L.R. at 52.
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assignee protection erga omnes and which does not fall within the class
of agreements and concerted practices referred to by the said Article857279
In essence, the issue was whether a contract for the exclusive showing of a
film, which was limited to the territory of a Member State, was prohib-
ited as a concerted practice in restraint of intra-Community trade under
article 85, or whether article 85 was inapplicable because the contract in-
volved the specific subject matter of copyright in film showings which was
protected under article 36.
The European Court noted, however, that Coditel II involved the
freedom to provide services rather than the freedom to move goods to
which article 36 expressly applied. Copyrights in film showings, unlike
copyrights in media such as books or records, "belong to the category of
literary and artistic works made available to the public by performances,
which may be infinitely repeated, and the marketing of which is a matter
of the provision of services, irrespective of the method of public diffusion,
whether cinema or television."280
Article 36 contained a general principle, however, which applied be-
yond the free movement of goods. The distinction underlying that article
is that whereas an industrial property right is created solely by national
law,281 Community law may affect the exercise of that right if it consti-
tuted a restriction on trade within the Community under article 36(2).
This general principle, the European Court concluded, applied equally to
the freedom to provide services.28 2
This much had been established in the earlier case, Coditel L The
European Court added, however, that this general principle also applied
to article 85, if the means of exercising industrial property rights took
"the form of an agreement, decision or concerted practice capable of hav-
ing as their object or effect the prevention, restriction or distortion of
competition within the Common Market."28 3 The Court stated:
The mere fact that the proprietor of a film copyright has granted to a
single licensee the exclusive right to exhibit the film in the territory of a
member-State, and therefore to prohibit its diffusion by others, for a
279 Id. at 3385, [1983] 1 Comm. Mkt. L.R. at 53. Article 85(1) provides as follows:
The following shall be deemed to be incompatible with the Common Market and
shall hereby be prohibited: all agreements between enterprises, any decisions by
associations of enterprises and any concerted practices which are likely to affect
trade between Member States and which have as their object or result the preven-
tion, restriction or distortion of competition within the Common Market ....
EEC Treaty, supra note 2, 298 U.N.T.S. at 47.
20 1982 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. at 3400, [1983] 1 Comm. Mkt. L.R. at 65.
281 Id. at 3401, [1983] 1 Comm. Mkt. L.R. at 65-66.
282 Id.
283 Id. at 3401, [1983] 1 Comm. Mkt. L.R. at 66.
1984
CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L.
specified period, is not sufficient however for a finding that such a con-
tract must be considered as the object, means or consequence of an
agreement, decision or concerted practice.2 s8
The European Court in Coditel II cautioned, however, that certain
methods of exercising copyrights in the exclusive showing of a film could
constitute an agreement or concerted practice which is prohibited by arti-
cle 85. This would be the case if the exercise of exclusive showing rights
were made "under economic or legal circumstances which have the effect
of substantially restricting distribution of films or distorting competition
in the film market, having regard to its [the market's] special
characteristics.""2 5
The European Court concluded, however, that the special character-
istics of the European film market indicated that it was unlikely that an
exclusive showing agreement of the kind at issue in Coditel II would pre-
vent, restrict or distort competition."8 6 These special features included:
(1) the different language groups which create submarkets and require a
special language dubbing industry; (2) the national regulation of televi-
sion broadcasting; and (3) the industry practice in film financing.28 7
The European Court concluded in Coditel II that the determination
of whether the exercise of a copyright resulted in a concerted practice in
violation of article 85 was a task for the national court.2 8 The European
Court suggested four factors for the national court to consider in making
its determination:
(1) Whether a copyright holder or his assign's exercise of the exclu-
sive showing rights in a film create "artificial and unjustified" barriers,
given the characteristics of the European film industry.
(2) Whether the royalties exceeded a "fair" return relative to the
investment in the film.
(3) Whether the time period of the exclusive agreement is excessive.
(4) Whether the exercise of this right "within a given geographical
area is such as to prevent, restrict or distort competition" within the
Community.
289
The European Court's decision in Coditel II did not address the issue of
whether, if an exclusive showing agreement was deemed to restrict intra-
Community trade, the agreement could be justified so as to protect the
specific subject matter of this form of intellectual property.
Advocate-General Reischl provided a more detailed analysis of this
284 Id.
285 Id.
286 Id.
287 Id.
288 Id.
288 Id. at 3402, [1983] 1 Comm. Mkt. L.R. at 66-67.
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issue in his opinion in Coditel II. The European Court seemed to assume
the conclusion expressed by the Advocate-General when it concluded in
Coditel II that "Article 85 is excluded from the outset where the issue is
one of safeguarding rights which form the specific subject-matter of an
industrial or other property right."2 9
The Advocate-General elaborated on Coditel I to explain his inter-
pretation of the specific subject matter of copyright in a film showing. 9 1
What matters is not only the mode of calculating the remuneration, but
also the guarantee of a proper remuneration for the intellectual accom-
plishment which the creation of the film represents, requiring as it does
the exploitation of a variety of forms of copyright (in music, literature,
etc.) and involving appreciable financial risks.292
The characteristics of the European film industry, as described by the
European Court's judgment above, would, in the Advocate-General's
opinion, justify certain methods of exploiting film rights, such as exclu-
sive showing contracts.2 93
The European Court's judgment impliedly adopted the reasoning of
the Advocate-General's opinion without ex] ressly so doing. The Euro-
pean Court suggested that national courts consider the special character-
istics of the European film industry. Specific provisions, to be deemed a
restraint on competition within the industry must involve excessive royal-
ties or unduly long exclusive arrangements. These considerations imply
that the copyright owner and its assignees will be allowed to protect the
specific subject matter of their rights in films. As Advocate-General Reis-
chl suggested, this included the calculation of and reasonable arrange-
ments for the securing of a reasonable return on the film investment.294
The European Court's opinion suggested that only attempts to obtain an
excessive return on a film investment would constitute a restraint on
competition within the Community in violation of article 85.295
In summary, the European Court responsed to the Belgian Cour de
Cassation in the following terms:
A contract conferring the exclusive right to exhibit a film on the territory
of a member-State for a specific period, granted by the owner of the cop-
yright in that work, is not as such subject to the prohibitions contained
29- Id. at 3409, [1983] 1 Comm. Mlkt. L.R. at 59.
291 Id. at 3407-08, [1983] 1 Comm. Mkt. L.R. at 59-63.
2,2 Id. at 3411, [1983] 1 Comm. Mkt. L.R. at 61. Much of this analysis is based on
Reischl's interpretation of L.C. Nungesser K.G. & Eisele v. E.C. Commission, Judgment of
June 8, 1982, Case 258/78 (unreported), discussed in 1982 E. Comm Ct. J. Rep. at 3412,
[1983] 1 Comm. Mkt. L.R. at 57-58.
293 1982 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. at 3412, [1983] 1 Comm. Mkt. L.R. at 61-62.
2- Id. at 3411-12, [1983] 1 Comm. Mkt. L.R. at 61-62.
295 Id. at 3402, [1983] 1 Comm. Mkt. L.R. at 66.
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in Article 85 of the Treaty. It is, however, where appropriate, for the
national court to ascertain whether in a given case the manner in which
the exclusive right conferred by that contract is exercised is subject to
arrangements the object or effect of which is to prevent or restrict the
distribution of films or to distort competition on the cinematographic
market, in the light of the specific characteristics of that market.2 9
The effect of the two Coditel cases may be stated as follows: Commu-
nity law permits an exception to the fundamental freedom to provide ser-
vices within the Community for the protection of the specific subject mat-
ter of an industrial property right. In the case of copyright in film, the
essential function is to allow the owner or its assignee to collect royalties
based on the number of performances of the protected film. This includes
the right of the owner or its assignee to prohibit unauthorized commercial
showings of its film for which a fee is charged the public. In effect, this
prohibits unauthorized parallel imports of film broadcasts into Member
States where the film is protected by domestic copyright laws.
Exclusive film showing agreements that are limited to specific geo-
graphical areas and time periods are not, per se, a violation of article 85.
Such exclusive agreements may act as a restraint on competition in the
European film industry depending on their specific provisions. Scrutiny
of these provisions by national courts should include several factors. In-
cluded among these are whether, under the specific commercial require-
ments of the European film industry, the agreement is for an excessive
period of time or seeks an excessive return on the copyright holder's
investment.
VI. CONCLUSION
The European Court's decisions have held that article 36 applies to
virtually all forms of industrial property rights, including patents, trade-
marks, copyrights, performance rights and industrial designs. The specific
subject matter of both trademarks and patents is well defined, although
Pfizer and Merck/Stephar suggest that the Court is further narrowing
the ability of trademark or patent holders to restrict intra-Community
trade. GEMA suggests that the same is true for copyrights and related
rights.
The European Court has recognized that copyright and related rights
are more complex than patents or trademarks for example. The decisions
of the Court of Justice have principally addressed the economic and com-
mercial aspects of copyrights and related rights. This suggests that the
European Court will not necessarily apply the same analysis to the moral
aspects of these rights, such as the author's right to protect the integrity
288 1982 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. at 3403, [1981] 1 Comm. Mkt. L.R. at 67.
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and authorship of his work. The European Court has shown a great will-
ingness, however, to consider individually the function of each different
form of copyright and to define the specific subject matter of each accord-
ingly. Hence, the moral aspects of intellectual property rights may be
subsumed into the European Court's traditional analysis, albeit with per-
haps greater deference to national law.
Technological developments will greatly complicate the task of defin-
ing the specific subject matter of intellectual property rights. Videotape
recording devices, for example, raise new questions of copyright law, as
does the development of direct broadcasting from satellites which, among
other things, makes the application of inconsistent national copyright
rules less compatible with Community goals. Advances in bio-technology,
such as the development of new hybrid agricultural products or commer-
cially useful microorganisms, present new wrinkles in patent law. Such
rapid and continuing technological advances underscore the need for, and
the difficulty of, resolving the conflict between national and community
law from a Community-wide perspective.
In a related area, the general principles of article 36 are now applica-
ble to the freedom to provide services. The European Court has also sug-
gested that it will analyze national rules on unfair competition in the
same manner as rules protecting industrial property. The European
Court, however, has not so expressly held. But its analytical approach in
Imerco and Beele2 7 is analogous to its analysis in industrial property
cases, although the rationale for its conclusions is different. The Euro-
pean Court has held that the protection of industrial property justifies an
exception to the free movement of goods because of the express terms of
article 36. The European Court appears to accept national rules on unfair
competition as an exception to the free movement of goods because such
rules are a mandatory protection for consumers. In both types of cases,
the European Court has focused on the elements justifying each excep-
tion. Only those elements merit an exception to fundamental Community
policies such as the free movement of goods or the freedom to provide
services.
The European Court's interpretation of article 36 has had an impact
beyond the narrow but important question of the extent to which a
holder of an intellectual property right, such as a trademark or copyright,
may exercise that right within the European Community. These cases
have also addressed the limitations on the exercise of that right based on
a second fundamental Community policy-the freedom to provide ser-
vices anywhere within the Community irrespective of national bounda-
ries. Collectively, these cases have significantly promoted the overall
'9 Industrie Densten Groep B.V. v. J.A. Beele Handelmaatschappij B.V., 1982 E.
Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 711, [1982] 3 Comm. Mkt. L.R. 102.
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Community goal of the economic integration of the Member States.
The inherently sporadic and uneven nature of decisional law, how-
ever, emphasizes the need for Community wide legislation in the area of
intellectual property. The pace of technological change will make it more
difficult in the future to achieve a satisfactory resolution of conflicts be-
tween diverse national laws and the goal of establishing a single Common
Market through the medium of decisional law alone.
